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Makes you wonder what the polluters are doing, that they feel they 
need their own special law to protect them from law students suing 
them for free as part of a school project. 
And I don’t mean that in a disparaging way toward law students at 
all. But when big industry seems to be so afraid of people who are 
still learning their profession, you’d have to think they’re doing 
some stuff so blatantly illegal that even a student can nail them for 
it.1 
Since 1976, when the first environmental clinic was started at the 
University of Oregon’s law school, clinics have proliferated. Today, 
approximately one out of five law schools has an environmental 
clinic.2 With respect to clinics in general, the Association of American 
Law Schools Directory of Law Teachers lists “nearly 1400 full-time 
faculty teaching clinical courses.”3 Yet far from being an 
uncontroverted part of the academic landscape, clinics—particularly 
environmental clinics—have endured political blowback4 from 
challenging the environmentally destructive behavior of major 
economic interests. The effectiveness of environmental clinics is no 
greater than established environmental organizations—perhaps less 
effective given the length of time it takes for law students guided by 
faculty to mount a legal challenge and the complexity and difficulty 
of the cases these clinics take on. Nonetheless, environmental clinics 
repeatedly find themselves the target of efforts to shut them down, 
restricted in the types of cases and/or clients they can take on, and 
 
1 Anonymous, Comment to Bill Would Ban Law Clinics Suing State, 
2THEADVOCATE.COM (May 18, 2010, 12:12 PM), http://www.2theadvocate.com/news 
/94030164.html. 
2 Gabriel Nelson, Law: Students’ Role in Farm Pollution Suit Angers Md. Lawmakers, 
Sparks Nat’l Debate, GREENWIRE (Apr. 8, 2010, 12:27 PM), http://www.eenews.net 
/public/Greenwire/2010/04/08/1. Thirty-five of those clinics, including one from British 
Columbia, Canada, participate in a listserv maintained by the University of South 
Carolina’s law school, on which clinicians share information and collectively problem 
solve. Clinics from many large state-funded schools are on the list. 
3 Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, Lawyering in the Academy: The Intersection of 
Academic Freedom and Professional Responsibility, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97, 98 (2009) 
[hereinafter Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy] (noting in addition that “a number 
of law professors act as attorneys in cases handled as part of law school seminars, applied 
legal research and writing classes, or live-client components of related upper-level 
substantive courses.” Id. (footnotes omitted)). See also id. (“[T]he American Bar 
Association . . . requires every accredited law school to offer substantial opportunities in 
live-client or other real-life practice experiences.”). 
4 Nelson, supra note 2. 
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limited by supervisory boards with the power of case approval. Why 
is this? What is it about law students working for credits and grades 
that powerful interests find so threatening that they spend their 
resources on eliminating clinics instead of confronting them in court? 
Is the attack on clinics part of a broader attack on public access to the 
courts for righting environmental wrongs? Do these attacks reflect 
something about the nature of the attacker and her victim? 
This Article seeks to answer those questions, and concludes that 
clinics, like environmental organizations, function in an environment 
that is exceptionally hostile to the types of clients they represent and 
the cases they bring. This means that the claims environmental clinics 
file, like those filed by the national groups, will be met with a barrage 
of opposing filings based on a number of jurisdictional and other 
challenges enabled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s anti-public interest 
jurisprudence. Unlike the well-funded, publicly visible, and widely 
supported national organizations, environmental clinics are more 
vulnerable to less conspicuous attacks brought directly by the 
economic interests they challenge and their political supporters.5 
Perhaps clinics unwittingly invite these attacks that in turn weaken 
their ability to function in this already hostile environment. The 
combination of the two can create a perfect storm for environmental 
clinics. 
Even more curious is the role that lawyers play in attacks on clinics 
and the bullying techniques they use to discourage clinic-initiated 
litigation. There is something about students that brings the bully out 
in those who face them across the table6 that goes beyond the usual 
 
5 The chief, often sole protectors of these clinics are other environmental clinics and 
professional organizations such as the American Bar Association and the Association of 
American Law Schools, who use their organizing and institutional capacities to mount 
counter campaigns. See, e.g., Letter from Susan Westerberg Prager, Exec. Dir., Chief 
Exec. Officer, Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., to Chancellor William E. Kirwan, Univ. Sys. of 
Md., and Clifford M. Kendall, Chair, Bd. of Regents, Univ. Sys. of Md. (Mar. 31, 2010) 
(offering assistance in combating concerns raised about the University of Maryland’s 
environmental clinic), reprinted in AALSNEWS (The Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., D.C.), May 
2010, at 2, available at http://www.aals.org/documents/newsletter/may2010newsletter.pdf; 
accord Statement of ABA President Lamm Re: Proposed Legislation Affecting Funding for 
University of Maryland School of Law, ABANOW (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.abanow.org 
/2010/04/statement-of-aba-president-lamm-re-proposed-legislation-affecting-funding-for   
-university-of-maryland-school-of-law/. 
6 I have witnessed this behavior many times during my nearly twenty years as a director 
of an environmental clinic at Georgetown University Law Center and it has never ceased 
to amaze me. Sometimes this behavior has revealed itself in letters threatening to cut off 
contributions to the Law Center or to seek sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of  
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reasons given for these attacks—namely, that environmental clinics 
empower people who are otherwise without power to confront those 
who disregard their interest, that they are successful, and that they 
have enormous staying power and endless student enthusiasm. This 
behavior, although part of the general incivility problem afflicting the 
legal profession, is something more, and has to do with the nature of 
today’s lawyers and the context in which they learned how to be 
lawyers and practice law. Although many articles have been written 
about attacks on environmental clinics,7 none has identified this 
second reason—the milieu in which lawyers are educated and 
trained—and placed it in the broader context of judicial hostility 
toward environmental claims brought against established economic 
interests. 
This Article lays the groundwork for these conclusions by first 
briefly discussing the origins of clinics and clinical pedagogy in 
general. Then it describes the various attacks on the clinics, some 
consequences of those attacks, and how certain responses to those 
attacks run afoul of basic ethical precepts as well as notions of 
academic freedom.8 The third part of the Article, after briefly listing 
some of the conventional reasons for these attacks, focuses on a less 
conventional one—namely, that they are fueled by the asocial 
behavior of lawyers who are in the vanguard of many of these attacks. 
It shows how such behavior is akin to that of a schoolyard bully who, 
in sensing a weaker opponent, acts out in ways that have been fodder 
for psychological literature. This part of the Article also describes the 
various barriers the Court has erected that make it difficult for public 
interest litigants, particularly poorly funded and understaffed 
environmental clinics, to prosecute legal claims representing 
 
Civil Procedure. Other times the behavior has manifested itself in shouting and threatening 
not to hire future graduates of the program if the clinic persists in its representation. 
7 See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying 
Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV. 235 (1999); Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, 
supra note 3; David Luban, Essay, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive 
Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209 (2003); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Political 
Interference in Law School Clinical Programs: Reflections on Outside Interference and 
Academic Freedom, 11 J.C. & U.L. 179 (1984); Nina W. Tarr, Ethics, Internal Law School 
Clinics, and Training the Next Generation of Poverty Lawyers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1011 (2009). 
8 Although the involvement of lawyers in these anti–environmental clinic campaigns 
raises questions about their professional responsibility, others have discussed this problem 
in detail; I do not revisit those issues here. See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An 
Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971 (2003) 
[hereinafter Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique]. 
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individuals who threaten the economic and political status quo. The 
Article concludes that the more conventional explanation for the 
attacks against clinics are incomplete because they neither explain the 
persistence of the attacks nor show how the combination of 
intimidation and hostile judicial doctrine make it extremely difficult 
for environmental clinics to do their job. 
I 
THE PUBLIC, PROFESSIONAL, AND PEDAGOGICAL BENEFITS         
OF CLINICAL EDUCATION 
Clinical education in United States law schools began in the 1960s 
in response to a concern that the schools were not sufficiently training 
their graduates to represent clients with real legal problems. To 
respond to that problem, law schools developed law clinics, which 
drew on the clinical model used by medical schools to the extent that 
they focused on the use of real legal problems with real clients as a 
means of training “law students in the skills that they [would] need to 
become effective and ethical lawyers.”9 One impetus for the growth 
of law school clinical programs was former Chief Justice Warren 
Burger’s statement, subsequently published in a law journal article, in 
which he reported that “‘from one-third to one-half of the lawyers 
who appear in the serious cases are not really qualified to render fully 
adequate representation’” and “called for expanded law school skills 
programs: [saying] ‘[t]he law school . . . is where the groundwork 
must be laid.’”10 
There are many public, professional, and pedagogical benefits that 
flow from law school clinics. First, law students offer legal assistance 
to individuals who cannot otherwise get access to the courts.11 A 
 
9 Letter from Susan Westerberg Prager, Exec. Dir., Chief Exec. Officer, Ass’n of Am. 
Law Sch., to Chancellor William E. Kirwan, Univ. Sys. of Md., and Clifford M. Kendall, 
Chair, Bd. of Regents, Univ. Sys. of Md. (Mar. 31, 2010) (explaining the origins of 
clinical legal education), reprinted in AALSNEWS (The Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., D.C.), 
May 2010, at 2, 3, available at http://www.aals.org/documents/newsletter/may2010 
newsletter.pdf. 
10 Jorge deNeve et al., Submission of the Association of American Law Schools to the 
Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana Concerning the Review of the Supreme Court’s 
Student Practice Rule, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 539, 542 (1997) (third alteration in original) 
(quoting Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and 
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 
233 (1973)). 
11 See id. at 565 n.20 (“Law students as well as practicing attorneys may provide an 
important source of legal representation for the indigent. . . . Given the huge increase in 
law school enrollments over the past few years, . . . I think it plain that law students can be  
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clinic, by “[p]roviding competent, effective legal representation to 
affected individuals and communities[,] helps to ‘level the playing 
field’ by empowering the relatively weak to stand up to and oppose 
the inherently strong.”12 Clinics fill a gap left by private practitioners 
who infrequently represent the type of clients clinics do because these 
individuals not only lack the resources to pay them, but also often 
raise claims that conflict with the interests of other clients the lawyer 
represents. In addition, “[l]aw school clinics may be one of the few 
places that the law school intersects with the local community.”13 This 
can lessen “town and gown” friction for the law school. Because of 
the type of clients clinics represent and the issues they bring to court, 
clinic students may also educate judges, administrators, and 
legislators about the importance of certain social justice issues and 
may themselves be subsequently “inspired . . . to re-engage in public 
interest lawyering” at a later point in their professional lives.14 
These benefits are not restricted to the courts. Clinics can and do 
play an important role in representing citizens before administrative 
agencies. Professor Marc Mihaly underscores the importance of 
providing expert help to citizens appearing before government 
agencies.15 According to Professor Mihaly, “[i]f we believe in the 
 
expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the 
representation of the poor in many areas, including cases reached by today’s decision.” 
(quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(alteration in original))). 
12 Stephen Wizner & Robert Solomon, Law as Politics: A Response to Adam Babich, 
11 CLINICAL L. REV. 473, 474 (2005). 
13 Tarr, supra note 7, at 1043. See also id. (noting as evidence of community 
relationship that “[f]or both good and bad, some clinics have set up advisory or community 
boards that can influence what types of cases are accepted, the focus of the programs, and 
other priorities”). But see Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 
CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 366 (2008) (“The external pressure of the market to train lawyers 
for designated functions⎯unyielding in the current political moment⎯is both a direct and 
indirect cause of the dilution (and sometimes, elimination) of the social justice mission of 
law school clinics.”); id. at 387 (“Law schools and universities, especially private 
institutions, are notoriously resistant to being held accountable to empowered community 
organizations and to answering for the choices that are made in program development.”). 
14 Robert Greenwald, The Role of Community-Based Clinical Legal Education in 
Supporting Public Interest Lawyering, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 569, 570 (2007). 
15 See Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental 
Decisions: Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions Through Partnership With Experts 
and Agents, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 207–08 (2009) (“[P]ublic participation without 
expert assistance in the process of environmental decision-making gives an appearance of 
participation without substance. . . . [It] is merely an opportunity to transmit views. 
Members of the public miss statutory or regulatory deadlines and fail to exhaust their legal 
remedies sufficiently to meet standing requirements. Their comments do not compete on a  
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underlying purpose of public participation, we must equip citizens 
with the agents and experts they need to make their participation 
authentic and effective.”16 The complexity of “[g]overnance in 
modern industrial democracy,” especially “environmental 
governance,” puts a premium on providing citizens with expertise and 
representation so that they can effectively participate in agency 
decision making on environmental matters.17 This expertise renders 
unassisted participation virtually useless.18 In the absence of 
assistance, filing deadlines are often missed, and issues that litigants 
want to bring before courts are not first properly vetted before the 
regulatory agency; consequently, courts can easily dismiss them 
based on the prudential exhaustion or ripeness doctrines.19 
Unrepresented citizen commentators may also commonly raise issues 
that are of concern to them and not to the decision-maker, with the 
result that they are ignored and the commentator loses credibility with 
the agency decision-maker.20 “[T]he difference between repetitive, 
useless input and valuable input frequently lies in the quality of 
 
technical level with the input of stakeholder and staff, proponents, and organized 
stakeholders. The process of environmental review serves primarily as a post hoc 
rationalization for a previously determined project design or rule formulation, and 
participation consultants or staff integration of the unassisted lay citizen into a process 
designed to give the appearance of participation without effect on the decision-makers. 
Sophisticated representation and use of experts can change this trajectory. A thoughtful 
partnership of citizens and experts can move the participatory effort from a mere 
expression of position to an effective force, one that reverses unstated agreements among 
project proponents and the agency, and brings citizens to the bargaining table with some 
significant power to exercise.” (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
16 Id. at 223. 
17 Id. at 226. Professor Mihaly singles out the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) as a congressional initiative that puts a premium on legal representation. See id. at 
198–99 (“Despite this de jure empowerment, NEPA and the little NEPA’s have operated 
to create a new forum for expertise more than empower the general public, and in the 
process these statutes have given rise to a new class of professionals[, creating a new role 
for attorneys].”); id. at 199 (“NEPA has created a new role for environmental consultants, 
both attorneys and other experts, and it is they who participate in the process, and they 
who ‘consume’ the participation rights.”). 
18 Id. at 151. 
19 See also id. at 211–12 (“The successful ‘invention’ and advocacy of an alternative, 
one that may be quite unwelcome to agency staff or existing stakeholders, must be so 
convincing that the agency or proponent’s counsel will advise that a conservative litigation 
prevention strategy requires inclusion of the alternative in the environmental document.”). 
20 See id. at 154 (“In [the absence of attorneys and consultant experts,] testimony 
frequently misses statutory or regulatory deadlines, fails to raise the issues necessary to 
exhaust administrative remedies, emphasizes policy issues of concern to the testigant, 
rather than the decision-maker, and makes points without foundation.”). 
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expertise provided to the citizen participant.”21 Professor Mihaly 
believes that 
[t]he assertion that public participation is alive and well in the 
absence of assistance by experts and attorneys also advantages 
those whose interests are served by minimizing the effects of 
disparity in resources. If public participation matters, we must begin 
with the understanding that it becomes most truly effective when 
conjoined with representation and expertise.22 
Good policy flows from a process that gives decision-makers the 
benefit of sharply and cogently presenting different views.23 When 
participation in either the regulatory or litigation process does not 
provide “useful new evidence or concepts to decision-makers of a 
rationalist government seeking the public interest,”24 it is ineffective 
and will have no effect on the ultimate decision.25 It seems clear, at 
least to Professor Mihaly, that citizens who wish to be effective either 
in the regulatory or judicial process require experts to help them 
“provide the sophisticated content, presentation, and political acuity 
necessary to have effect. . . . [E]nvironmental decision-makers require 
technical input, which unassisted lay participants cannot provide.”26 
Mihaly goes on to say that 
 
21 Id. at 161. 
22 Id. at 226. 
23 See id. at 162 (“Good policy flows from processes that give decision-makers the 
benefit of conflicting views. The environmental arena is marked by pervasive conflict over 
the application of theories, the underlying data, and disputes over how to incorporate the 
resulting uncertainty into decision-making.”). See also David L. Markell, Citizen-Friendly 
Approaches to Environmental Governance, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,362, 
at 10,363 (2007), available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol37/37.10362.pdf 
(“Proponents suggest that greater opportunities for public involvement in agency 
decisionmaking processes may help to enhance accountability and transparency in 
governance, contribute to more informed, and thereby improved, results, and foster a 
greater degree of connection between the governed and the governing (and a blurring of 
the line between the two) that leads to greater social capital and societal trust.” (footnote 
omitted)); id. (“[Procedural justice] literature suggests that citizens’ assessments of the 
fairness of third-party decisionmaking procedures are important to judgments about the 
legitimacy of such processes, independent of the outcomes of such procedures.”). 
24 Mihaly, supra note 15, at 166. 
25 See id. at 167 (“Presentation determines outcome. Citizens who do not understand 
the rules and customs of the forum will make presentations that have the appearance, if not 
the substance, of amateurism, and decision-makers will discount the material presented.”). 
See also id. (“[U]nassisted lay participants who express conclusory opinions unsupported 
by a substantial factual underlay will have no material effect on the ultimate outcome.”). 
26 Id. at 168. Although Mihaly does not say that attorneys are the only experts who can 
provide this expertise, he notes that it is usually lawyers who provide this assistance. Id. 
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[d]ecision-makers, whether administrative law judges, corporate 
leaders or governmental officials, need expertise . . . . The solution . 
. . lies not in a naive embrace of unassisted lay citizen advocacy, but 
rather in the ability to combine the energy and political value of a 
grass roots group with the expertise necessary to craft a message 
that will alter the course of an environmental decision-making 
process.27 
Environmental clinics can, and often do, play a critical role in 
advising clients in the agency decision-making process. 
Second, there seems to be near universal agreement that clinics 
provide important academic and professional learning opportunities 
for law students. According to Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the 
University of California at Irvine’s law school, 
There is no better way to prepare students to be lawyers than for 
them to participate in clinical education. Clinics provide students 
the opportunity to practice law under close supervision and thus can 
provide students education in the lawyering skills and professional 
values that they will be using as attorneys, whether they practice in 
the private sector, government, or public interest organizations. 
Law, which is inevitably abstract in a classroom, becomes real 
when the student has to advise a client, negotiate a deal, or argue to 
a judge.28 
Clinical education is widely seen among law school educators as 
enhancing the curriculum of law schools and as “an important 
component of the overall education of our nation’s future lawyers.”29 
Law school clinics are not only “unique vehicles for law schools to 
expose law students to the professional skills that they must develop,” 
but they also “strongly reinforce the non-clinical curriculum in 
developing student’s legal analysis and research skills” as they 
“provide law students paramount opportunities to engage in problem 
solving, factual investigation, counseling, and negotiation.”30 They 
offer “experiential learning through working with clients,” provide 
 
27 Id. at 172. 
28 Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Not Clinical Education?, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 35, 35 
(2009). 
29 deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 539. See also id. at 540 (discussing that clinical 
education most decidedly “is not ‘an “amusing” academic exercise,’ but rather is an 
important component of a quality law school curriculum”). 
30 Id. at 543–44; see also id. at 544 (“Prior to the advent of clinical programs, these 
skills ‘had previously been considered as incapable of being taught other than through the 
direct practice experience’ of a newly-licensed lawyer.” (quoting ABA Task Force on Law 
Schools and the Profession, Legal Education and Professional Development—An 
Educational Continuum (Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: 
Narrowing the Gap) 234 (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report])). 
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future lawyers “with the opportunity to better understand and help 
bridge the access-to-justice gap of poor and low-income clients in 
their own communities,” and help “to seed in law students a 
professional commitment to public service.”31 Another benefit of law 
school clinics, not often referred to, is that they can become “the law 
school’s research laboratory for the development of new ideas” 
through the litigation of often difficult and conceptually challenging 
cases, providing an opportunity for clinicians and clinical students to 
develop new legal theories and expand existing legal doctrine.32 
“Clinical education is more than a trial advocacy course or a 
clerkship at a law firm” because students are taught how to 
reflect on the practice of law; how to integrate the doctrines learned 
in traditional classes into practice; how to formulate hypotheses and 
test them in the real world; how to approach each decision 
creatively and analytically; how to identify and resolve issues of 
professional responsibility; and how to expand existing legal 
doctrine for the protection of the poor and powerless.33 
Clinical instruction emphasizes the “conceptual underpinnings” of 
skills that lawyers learn in their law practices.34 However, clinical 
supervisors do a better job of assessing law student skills and 
providing feedback on student performance because they “provide 
more intensive guidance than is generally available in any other 
 
31 Greenwald, supra note 14, at 569. 
32 deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 555. These new theories and cases also provide grist 
for scholarly writings such as this article. See also Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican 
Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty 
Re-envisioned, Re-invigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443 (2005) 
(representation of that same tribe led to an exploration of Indian sovereignty); Hope M. 
Babcock, Administering the Clean Water Act: Do Regulators Have “Bigger Fish to Fry” 
When It Comes to Addressing the Practice of Chumming on the Chesapeake Bay?, 21 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007) (triggered by the filing of a state rulemaking petition); Hope M. 
Babcock, Environmental Justice Clinics: Visible Models of Justice, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
3 (1995) (grew out of establishing one of the first environmental justice clinics in the 
country); Hope M. Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions: 
Water, Water Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203 (2006) 
(grew out of the representation of an eastern state-recognized Indian tribe trying to protect 
its traditional fishing grounds). 
33 deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 544; see also id. at 547 (“[L]aw school clinics 
provide unique educational opportunities for students to integrate ‘all the fundamental 
lawyering skills’ and professional values into an actual practice setting. . . . Clinics provide 
students with an opportunity to reflect on the development of their lawyering skills. 
Clinics also provide an unmatched level of supervision and guidance.” (quoting MacCrate 
Report, supra note 30, at 238)). 
34 Id. at 545 (quoting MacCrate Report, supra note 30, at 234). 
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setting.”35 This “distinguishes clinical training from the unstructured 
practice experience students encounter after graduation.”36 
The focus on applied learning and the close supervision provided in 
clinical programs “enables students to relate their later practice 
experience to concepts they have learned in law school.” . . . This 
training can be translated into a fuller understanding of how to 
recognize and resolve the ethical dilemmas encountered in actual 
practice. The same dynamic applies to the training that clinical 
programs offer in the organization and management of legal work.37 
Students emerge from clinics with enhanced legal skills and a more 
robust understanding of ethical issues than had they entered practice 
without this training. As a result, they bring a higher level of 
professionalism into the practice area or forum they chose to enter. 
Despite their public, pedagogical, and professional benefits, law 
school clinics—especially environmental clinics—have been subject 
to persistent attacks by the economic and political interests they 
challenge. The next section describes some of these attacks, their 
sources, and their subtle and not so subtle impacts on environmental 
clinical practice. 
II 
THE SORDID HISTORY OF SOME ANTI-CLINIC CAMPAIGNS,        
THE TOOLS CLINICAL OPPONENTS USE,                                                
AND SOME EFFECTS OF THESE CAMPAIGNS 
This part of the Article briefly describes the history of some of the 
more prominent attacks on law school clinics, particularly 
environmental clinics. It identifies some of the tools used in those 
campaigns by clinic opponents and then tries to grapple with some of 
the effects of these campaigns not only on specific clinics, but on 
public interest representation in general. 
 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (quoting Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory 
Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 280 (1982)); see also id. (“This close and direct faculty 
supervision, and the resulting ‘co-counsel’ relationship [creates] an effective adult-
learning environment.” (quoting Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal 
Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 347 (1982))). 
37 Id. at 546 (citations omitted) (quoting MacCrate Report, supra note 30, at 234). 
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A.  A Brief Recitation of the History of Clinical Attacks                
and of Some Conventional Reasons Why They Happen 
Given the clients clinics represent and the established interests they 
challenge on their clients’ behalf, it is no surprise that clinics in 
general have engendered strong opposition.38 
State-funded law schools have been the predominant target for such 
interference. This is due to their vulnerability to the political views 
of elected officials, the perceived impropriety of a state-funded 
school suing to require another state entity to spend taxpayer 
moneys, concerns that law clinic lawsuits against important 
industries might undermine the economic base of the state, 
disagreement with the use of taxpayer money to fund legal services 
for the poor, or a desire to avoid “taking sides” on controversial 
social or political issues.39 
However, the repeated assaults on Tulane Law School’s 
environmental clinic40 show the vulnerability of even private law 
schools to such attacks.41 According to Professors Kuehn and Joy, 
 
38 See Statement of ABA President Lamm Re: Proposed Legislation Affecting Funding 
for University of Maryland School of Law, ABANOW (Apr. 1, 2010), 
http://www.abanow.org/2010/04/statement-of-aba-president-lamm-re-proposed-legislation 
-affecting-funding-for-university-of-maryland-school-of-law/ (“Law school clinical 
programs provide immensely valuable public service in making legal assistance available 
to members of society who might not otherwise have access to the justice system. At the 
same time, [they teach students] about navigating court systems, about how the law works 
to meet clients’ needs, and about lawyers’ fundamental professional responsibility to 
advocate for clients who cannot advocate for themselves, even when the clients or their 
causes might prove unpopular or controversial. . . . Yet there is a [legislative] proposal . . . 
to withhold funds from the [law school] unless [the clinic] reports [to the legislature] on 
clients and cases served by the school’s clinical legal program, expenditures for those 
cases and funding sources [because it is an intrusion of the attorney client relationship].”); 
Robert R. Kuehn, The Attack on the University of Maryland Law School Clinics, CLINICAL 
LEGAL EDUC. ASS’N (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.law.umaryland.edu/about/features 
/enviroclinic/documents/CLEA.pdf (expressing concern over the attack on the University 
of Maryland environmental clinic because it interferes with the clinic’s ability to 
“zealously” represent its clients and to assure access to the justice system for all those who 
cannot afford adequate legal counsel because of economic or social constraints, 
particularly objecting to the interference happening “at the bidding of wealthy, powerful 
poultry interests”). 
39 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1990; see also id. at 1977–89 
(discussing attacks by state legislatures on state-funded clinics in Connecticut, Arkansas, 
Colorado, *Idaho, Iowa, Tennessee, *Rutgers, *Arizona State University College of Law, 
*Oregon (1981), *Tulane (1982), *Wyoming, *Pittsburgh (1985), and St. Mary’s law 
schools (asterisked schools are publicly funded law schools)). 
40 The continuing nature of these attacks was recently confirmed by a letter sent this 
summer from the operator of a landfill that had been the subject of neighborhood disputes 
since it opened in the early 1980s in a predominantly lower income, African American 
community, threatening the members of Tulane University’s Board of Trustees and the  
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[w]hile early attacks were often defended [by the attackers] on the 
unfounded belief that clinics were interfering with the ability of 
members of the bar to compete for paying clients, or motivated by a 
desire to prevent lawsuits against the state, more recent attacks, 
such as those on environmental law clinics, appear to be motivated 
by a desire to protect the financial interests of clients, alumni, and 
university donors. . . . [T]he true concern of law clinic critics is that 
clinics are “bringing suits that wouldn’t be brought at all if the 
clinic didn’t do it.”42 
Environmental clinics have been the “principal lightning rod” 
drawing most of these attacks.43 For example, a lawsuit by the 
Maryland environmental clinic against a major poultry company 
provoked a Maryland state senator to introduce legislation in the 
General Assembly withholding  
$750,000 in university funding until all 22 of the Law School’s 
clinics submitted a report “listing and describing each legal case in 
the past five years in which they participated in a court action, 
including the client represented, complete delineation of the 
expenditures for each case, and the source of funds for each 
expenditure.”44  
 
environmental clinic’s legal advisory board with a lawsuit for their collective failure to 
properly supervise clinic attorneys. See Letter from Adam Babich, Professor, Tulane Univ. 
Law Sch., to W.L. West, Lemle & Kelleher, L.L.P. (Sept. 2, 2010) (on file with author). 
The triggering event for the letter was the clinic sending a notice of violation to the landfill 
owners the previous month. Id. 
41 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1990. While serving as director of 
Georgetown’s environmental clinic, I received one letter from a prominent Washington 
lawyer threatening the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions if I did not withdraw from a case, 
and the dean of the Law Center received a letter from the president of a company that we 
were opposing in a state administrative licensing proceeding, also a graduate of the Law 
Center, threatening to withdraw his financial support from the school if we did not end our 
opposition. 
42 Id. (footnote omitted). 
43 See Luban, supra note 7, at 237 (citing as examples attacks on environmental law 
clinics at West Virginia, Wyoming, Pittsburgh, and Tulane law schools). 
44 Jamie Smith, Into the Fire: State Legislators Fuel a Heated Debate on Clinical Legal 
Education, IN PRACTICE (The Clinical Law Program at the Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, 
Balt. Md.) Spring 2010, at 1, available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/programs 
/clinic/documents/ClinicSpring2010.pdf. A massive effort by the American Bar 
Association, national legal education associations, and more than 500 individual faculty 
members and deans as well as untold letters, e-mails, and phone calls from Maryland Law 
School alumni and students reduced the proposed bill to a request for public information 
about the environmental law clinic’s cases over the past two years. Id. at 2. 
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A similar effort led by Louisiana’s Chemical Association (LCA)45 
resulted in the introduction of legislation forbidding law clinics at 
public and private law schools that receive state funds from suing 
government agencies, individuals, and businesses for damages or 
from “raising most constitutional challenges.”46 The legislation would 
also have given the legislature oversight over law clinics.47 
One obvious explanation for these attacks is that environmental 
clinics and their clients frequently adopt anti-development positions 
that threaten important established economic and political interests.48 
According to Professor Stephen Wizner, “[u]nlike most (all?) other 
law school clinics, environmental clinics, by definition, handle only 
cases that seek to prevent government or industry from carrying out 
projects involving land use, industrial development, and 
manufacturing” that endanger not only the environment in some way, 
but also where the litigation jeopardizes some established economic 
interests.49 The obvious result of challenging “powerful interests or 
affect[ing] issues of community or statewide concern,” is that 
“controversy becomes almost inescapable.”50 
“Empowering individual citizens, or community groups, to stand 
up to the powerful forces of government and industry by providing 
them with competent legal advocates is political, however one defines 
that word.”51 The response to environmental clinics is often also 
 
45 The breathtaking reach of LCA’s campaign against Tulane included urging its 
members to: stop their corporate support of Tulane, including matched employee giving 
and recruiting; personally contact all of the school’s charitable donors to educate them 
about the environmental clinic’s activities; work to reduce or eliminate all state general 
appropriation support for Tulane; urge the state Board of Regents to cease any support of 
Tulane; and enlist the efforts of the Governor and Louisiana’s congressional delegation in 
emphasizing the detrimental impact of Tulane’s environmental clinic’s activities on the 
state’s manufacturing jobs. Memorandum from Dan. S. Borne, President, La. Chem. 
Ass’n, to the Members of La. Chem. Ass’n (May 7, 2010) [hereinafter LCA 
Memorandum] (on file with author). 
46 Jordan Blum, Bill Would Ban Law Clinics Suing State, 2THEADVOCATE.COM (May 
18, 2010), http://www.2theadvocate.com/news/94030164.html. 
47 Id. 
48 See Luban, supra note 7, at 237 (saying these positions “put them at odds with 
business interests”); id. at 238 (describing how the Western Legal Foundation put an anti-
clinic attack ad in the New York Times, explaining the reasons for its opposition to law 
school clinics). 
49 Wizner & Solomon, supra note 12, at 473. 
50 Adam Babich, The Apolitical Law School Clinic, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 447, 447 
(2005). 
51 Wizner & Solomon, supra note 12, at 473 (“If there is any clinic that is inherently 
‘political,’ it is an environmental clinic.”). See also Tarr, supra note 7, at 1042  
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political. Some state legislatures have restricted the scope of clinical 
practice by conditioning the school’s receipt of public funds.52 For 
example, a North Dakota state grant program limited the remedies 
available in suits brought by clinics against state agencies to 
declaratory and injunctive relief, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
attempted to require “that a grantee could not file suit against the 
agency unless the grantee’s attorney first attempted to informally 
resolve the matter.”53 Similar restrictions may even be “imposed by 
the law school or university to avoid political or funding 
 
(“[A]ccording to the ethics rules in most states, a lawyer’s work with a client is not an 
endorsement of that ‘client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.’ 
Nevertheless, law clinics, particularly those associated with public institutions or those 
engaged in politically controversial work like environmental law clinics, are the target of 
attacks because of the work they do for clients and organizations. As state funding for 
public education diminishes, public law schools are functioning more like private 
institutions, but the affiliation or identification as a state school continues to create 
conflicts for the legal work the clinic might provide.” (footnotes omitted)). Recent 
examples of such attacks are those levied against Tulane and the University of Maryland’s 
environmental law clinics. See Bill Barrow, Tulane Still Target of Law Clinics Bill, 
Though Amendments Could Spare Loyola, Others, NOLA.COM (May 17, 2010, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/05/tulane_still_target _of_law_cli.html; Law: 
Fight Over Environmental Clinics Moves to La., GREENWIRE (May 11, 2010, 12:53 PM), 
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/05/11/14 (describing a bill, supported by the 
Louisiana Chemical Association, introduced by a state legislator prohibiting law clinics at 
state-funded universities from filing lawsuits against government agencies, seeking money 
damages, or making state constitutional claims, which while not explicitly referencing 
either Tulane or environmental clinics, “carves out exceptions” for criminal defense, 
family law, and domestic violence clinics); Nelson, supra note 2 (describing how a Clean 
Water Act lawsuit against Perdue Farms and an 80,000-bird poultry farm triggered the 
passage by both houses of the Maryland legislature legislation requiring the environmental 
law clinic to turn over to the legislators a breakdown of clients and budgets for the past 
two years, stripping from the bill provisions that would have levied a $250,000 fine 
against the University if it did not comply); see also id. (discussing how the “political 
blowback that Maryland’s [environmental] clinic has encountered” is not an isolated 
occurrence: the University of Pittsburgh’s environmental law clinic had to scramble to find 
new sources of funding ten years after the state legislature modified the University’s 
appropriation to prohibit the clinic from using public money as a result of its involvement 
in lawsuits seeking to block timber sales in Pennsylvania’s Allegheny National Forest; the 
environmental law clinic at Rutgers University was sued by real estate developers in 2006 
after it represented clients opposed to a controversial shopping mall project—the state 
Supreme Court eventually sided with the clinic; the University of Oregon’s environmental 
law clinic was finally “spun off from the university in 1993” in response to a threat by 
state lawmakers—who were egged on by state business organizations, angry over the 
clinic’s work on endangered species litigation involving timber sales—to shutter the entire 
law school, after more than a decade of sparring with legislators over the clinic’s 
continued existence). 
52 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 2030. 
53 Id. at 2035. 
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controversies, or voluntarily imposed by the law clinic as ways to 
avoid possible controversies, allocate scarce clinic resources, or 
advance educational goals.”54 
“Law school clinic directors, therefore, often find themselves 
trying to defuse, avoid, embrace, or otherwise manage controversy.”55 
Clinics have an ally in the courts, with the notable exception of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court. That court “remains the only court that has 
responded to clinic critics by restricting the cases and clients that law 
clinics may handle.”56 Most courts have generally been protective of 
law school clinics and their supervising attorneys and have expanded 
student practice rules addressing the cases and clients clinics can take 
on.57 Professors Kuehn and Joy note that the refusal of federal courts 
to adopt Louisiana’s student practice rule restrictions, as well as 
criticism by judges in other states of that state’s Supreme Court’s 
actions, “suggest[s] that, contrary to the desire of critics of law school 
clinics, Louisiana’s narrow view of the appropriate role of law 
schools in providing legal services to needy clients and causes is not 
typically shared by other members of the judiciary.”58 
B.  Tools Used to Attack Law School Environmental Clinics 
and Ones That May Be Used in the Future 
Those who attack environmental clinics use a variety of tools, such 
as cutting off clinic funds or the funds of the parent university, 
requiring that clinic cases be pre-approved by internal or external 
boards, and arranging that the clinic’s authority to bring certain types 
of cases or represent certain types of clients be eliminated or severely 
curtailed. Most often, disgruntled economic interests who find 
 
54 Id. at 2030. 
55 Babich, supra note 50, at 447. Perhaps in response to Tulane’s “bruising battle” 
against the state over his clinic’s continued existence, Professor Babich proposes what he 
calls the apolitical environmental law clinic that maintains a non-substantive agenda and 
focuses on empowering clients while still offering pedagogical advantages and services to 
Tulane’s “diverse constituencies.” Id. at 450–51. But see Wizner & Solomon, supra note 
12, at 474 (disagreeing with Babich that an environmental clinic can ever be apolitical 
because they “are inherently ‘political,’ that is, they are designed to empower those 
without power to assert their interests in opposition to the competing interests of the rich 
and powerful”). 
56 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1991. 
57 Id. But see id. at 1976 n.13 (reporting on actions of Michigan juvenile court judges in 
denying court appointments to Michigan Law School’s child Advocacy Clinic, as an 
example of at least one court expressing its “displeasure with a clinic’s policies or 
litigation strategies”). 
58 Id. at 1991–92. 
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themselves as defendants in clinic lawsuits—such as the chemical 
industry in Louisiana or the poultry industry in Maryland—are behind 
such initiatives. 
As noted previously, state law schools are particularly vulnerable 
to the withdrawal of public funding. Private schools who “are 
dominated by private bar ‘benefactors’ and boards of trustees” and 
state-funded law schools that rely on private fundraising to 
supplement their public revenue are also susceptible to threats of 
funding withdrawal by individuals.59 “Soft money and grants are 
another source of unwarranted interference in the work of clinics. . . . 
Law school clinics no longer rely heavily on federal grants, but may 
still receive state, local, or foundation money [that donors can 
condition in ways] that constrains the ability of the lawyers in the 
clinic to represent clients fully.”60 Such threats can have a serious 
chilling effect on a vulnerable clinic’s practice. 
Law schools have diverse constituencies, and while they may share 
common educational and professional goals, they may not share 
“substantive philosophies,” especially concerning how conflicts 
between commercial development and environmental protection 
should be resolved.61 “[N]o one likes to be sued,” and this fact can 
create obdurate enemies for the clinic even among those who support 
the idea of clinical education in the abstract.62 This reality may 
dampen the enthusiasm of clinical directors to campaign against those 
who criticize their work, since “[t]he same people dedicated to de-
lawyering your clients may be potential or current supporters of your 
institution.”63 Schools that adopt policies or procedures that limit a 
clinic’s choice of cases, clients, potential defendants, or court-ordered 
remedies, such as seeking an award of attorneys’ fees against a state 
agency, are generally undertaking such initiatives “to shield the 
 
59 Ashar, supra note 13, at 413. 
60 Tarr, supra note 7, at 1043. 
61 Babich, supra note 50, at 460 (noting how law schools such as Tulane have “a 
constituency as diverse as the legal profession itself” resulting in the varying views of 
Tulane and its supporters about how to reconcile the conflict between “commerce and 
environmental protection, [which] are presumably all over the map”). 
62 Id. at 468 (“[S]ome law-school constituents may never become clinic supporters, just 
as some academic research may be unpopular with some constituents.”). 
63 Id. (explaining the reluctance of clinicians “to treat their critics as enemies”). 
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university from criticism by politicians and possible threats to state 
funding.”64 
Sometimes clinic opponents are graduates of the law school or the 
parent university. 
Alumni are major constituents of most law schools and can apply 
both positive and negative pressures involving law clinics. As 
donors, they can financially support clinics but may insist on a 
particular political bent or content . . . . They may also put financial 
pressure on law school deans to eliminate a clinic that the donor 
perceives to be inconsistent with a particular perspective.65 
Alumni are also potential employers of students, and irritating them 
may economically disadvantage students. This fact can be especially 
problematic for students in a tight job market,66 such as the one 
currently facing law school graduates.67 This may lead students who 
are dependent on particular alumni networks for assistance in finding 
a job to avoid participating in a clinic that has drawn that alumnus’ 
ire.68 To the extent that “the desires and preferences of law students 
and law professors . . . are shaped by dominant market forces,” and 
when those forces oppose what a clinic is doing, the internal support 
for the clinic can be subtlety affected within the law school.69 
An extreme litigation tool used by defendants in environmental 
lawsuits, although not yet to my knowledge against any 
environmental clinic, is the strategic lawsuit against public 
participation, or SLAPP suits as they are commonly known.70 It is 
worth spending a moment on this type of litigation because there is 
every reason to think that those who try to intimidate law clinics from 
 
64 Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 115. See also id. at 116 
(“[Direct d]ecanal control over individual case selection is usually motivated by a desire to 
avoid bad publicity or outside attacks on the school.”). 
65 Tarr, supra note 7, at 1042 (footnote omitted). 
66 See id. (“Alumni are potential employers for the students and have sometimes been 
useful in supporting efforts to expand professional training in the school, but their 
perception of what is needed may not coincide with the clinic faculty’s opinions.”). 
67 See, e.g., Katy Hopkins, Law Jobs Will Be Harder to Come By, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (June 25, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-law-schools/articles 
/2010/06/25/law-jobs-will-be-harder-to-come-by.html. 
68 See Tarr, supra note 7, at 1042 (“Students rely heavily on alumni networks when job 
hunting, and if alumni are unhappy about a clinic, students may shy away from 
participating.”). 
69 Ashar, supra note 13, at 413 (footnote omitted). 
70 See Luban, supra note 7, at 219 (describing SLAPP suits as a “[l]ess familiar, but 
equally important, . . . adversarial attempt to exclude voices rather than information from 
the process”). 
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initiating certain types of actions in court will eventually start using 
them against clinic clients. 
SLAPP suits, like clinic harassment campaigns, are intended to 
frighten into silence those who threaten established economic 
interests. Both seek to stop citizens from engaging in processes that 
protect their interests and both engage in “abusive” practices. SLAPP 
suits, like anti-clinic campaigns, impose a heavy cost not only on their 
target, but also on society by preventing individuals from 
participating in “government programs that rely on citizen input to 
perform their functions” and by delaying “solutions to the problems 
that gave rise to the lawsuits.”71 
“SLAPP suits typically pose as common tort actions such as 
defamation, interference with a contract, restraint of trade, conspiracy, 
due process violations, and even abuse of process or malicious 
prosecution claims.”72 Not surprisingly, among the areas of law 
drawing the most attention by SLAPP plaintiffs are real estate 
development, zoning, and environmental law.73 Not in My Backyard 
(popularly known as NIMBY) suits are another common form of 
SLAPP suit, often involving wilderness, pollution, and animal rights 
issues, and targeting groups such as “The Sierra Club, eco-activists, 
and land trusts.”74 These suits transform what are essentially political 
disputes into legal ones by alleging “some technical legal injury,” 
taking “the debate out of the public forum and into a judicial forum, 
where only the technicalities of the legal injury can be addressed, 
instead of the underlying problem’s political implications.”75 In a 
SLAPP suit, “the focus is shifted away from the citizen’s claimed 
injury and onto the filer’s alleged injury. These transformations all 
 
71 P. Caleb Patterson, Comment, Have I Been SLAPPed? Arkansas’s Attempt to Curb 
Abusive Litigation: The Citizen Participation in Government Act, 60 ARK. L. REV. 507, 
508 (2007). 
72 Id. at 511–12; see also id. (“All of these are attempts to tack legal consequences onto 
what is, at its core, a wholly lawful exercise of the citizen’s petition rights.”); see also id. 
at 507 (“Abusive litigation is a tactic used to punish citizens who exercise their right to 
petition in our democracy.”). 
73 Id. at 512, 526 (listing other SLAPP targets as including consumer rights, animal 
rights, public officials, civil rights, and neighborhood problems, among others; “[r]eal 
estate SLAPPs are the largest category of abusive litigation suits, comprising a full one-
third of all such suits filed.”). 
74 Id. at 528 (footnotes omitted). 
75 Id. at 510–11. 
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serve the filer’s ultimate interest of silencing debate on the original 
political issue.”76 
Even though, according to Professor Luban, eighty percent of 
SLAPP suits are dismissed before trial, this does not matter—their 
“aim is not legal victory but intimidation.”77 SLAPP suit 
“[d]efendants facing ruinous legal bills and the risk of substantial 
personal liability agree to cease protest activities in return for having 
the SLAPP suit dropped.”78 These liabilities effectively compel 
SLAPP suit defendants to drop any legal initiative they had taken 
against the SLAPP suit plaintiff. One estimate is that since the 1970s 
 
76 Id. at 511 (footnote omitted). 
77 Luban, supra note 7, at 219. See also Patterson, supra note 71, at 507–08 (noting the 
actual goal of these suits is not a “win in court,” but to “intimidate and harass political 
critics into silence . . . .”); id. at 512 (“A SLAPP filer never really intends to win the 
lawsuit on its merits; his goal is to drag the litigation out as long as possible and force the 
target to focus what resources she may have on defending the suit.” (footnote omitted)). 
Another tool used by defendants to frighten public interest plaintiffs into dropping their 
lawsuits is Rule 68. See generally Jenny R. Rubin, Note, Rule 68: A Red Herring in 
Environmental Citizen Suits, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 849, 852 (1999) (“[Under Rule 
68,] defendants may make an offer of judgment anytime [sic] after receiving a complaint. 
Invoking Rule 68 shortly after the case is filed ensures that most of the defendant’s 
attorneys’ fees will be recoverable from the plaintiff if the plaintiff prevails but is awarded 
less than provided for in the offer.”); id. at 853 (“[T]o the extent that Rule 68 discourages 
citizen suit enforcement of environmental laws, the Rule prevents implementation of the 
environmental protection scheme envisioned by Congress. . . . [Since] most environmental 
statutes include attorneys’ fees in their definition of costs, [this makes a public interest] 
plaintiff who rejects an offer of judgment potentially liable for the defendant’s post-offer 
attorneys’ fees.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 852 (“Because many federal statutes 
promoting public interest litigation do define attorneys’ fees [including defendants’ 
attorneys’ fees] as recoverable costs, Rule 68 has become a powerful inducement to 
settlement in public interest litigation.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 853–54 (“[Since public 
interest plaintiffs] have limited funds, the ability of defendants to recover attorneys’ fees 
shifts the balance of power in settlement negotiations in favor of defendants. Because 
accepting an offer of judgment is the only certain means of avoiding liability for the 
defendant’s fees and costs, plaintiffs claim that they are coerced into accepting 
unfavorable settlements.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 852–53 (“First, these offers present 
the threat of a large assessment of costs against the plaintiff, which the plaintiff is 
guaranteed to avoid only by accepting the offer. Second, at the early stages of litigation, it 
is extremely difficult for the plaintiff to adequately assess an offer of judgment and weigh 
the inherent risks of accepting or rejecting it. Finally, since many public interest suits seek 
injunctive relief, the undeveloped information available early in litigation makes it hard for 
plaintiffs to evaluate whether an offer consisting only of monetary relief is acceptable.” 
(footnotes omitted)). According to Rubin, “the risk of liability for the defendant’s post-
offer costs is the main obstacle to vigorous citizen suit prosecution[,]” and “prevents 
citizen plaintiffs from fully litigating their claims, even though such process is a 
substantive right under federal environmental law. Thus, the risk of having to pay such 
fees presents a significant deterrent to effective citizen suit litigation.” Id. at 853–54. 
78 Luban, supra note 7, at 219. 
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when these lawsuits started to be filed, “thousands of citizens have 
been directly sued and thousands more have been frightened into 
silence by the threat of such suits.”79 In this regard, SLAPP suits and 
the attacks on environmental clinics share a common goal—drive the 
environmental plaintiffs out of court and eliminate their ability to sue. 
C.  Some Effects of These Attacks 
Although the risk of personal liability may be less for clinical 
directors and clinical students than defendants in a SLAPP suit, 
nonetheless anti-clinic campaigns have been effective in curtailing 
clinic activities in some instances.80 Even when an attack fails, they 
are frequently “near misses,” and because “eventually some will 
succeed[,]”81 the fear of such an attack can have a chilling effect on 
environmental clinics at other schools. When these attacks result in 
the imposition of restrictions on the cases and clients a clinic can take, 
they “do not simply drive the needy client to another lawyer outside 
the law school but deny legal assistance altogether.”82 They may also 
create ethical dilemmas for clinicians and academic freedom issues 
for the parent law school. 
One indirect effect of publicized attacks on environmental clinics 
has been to dissuade similar clinics at other schools from taking on 
controversial cases or clients “because of fears that taking such cases 
could result in threats to their continued operation.”83 For example, 
after the first attack on Tulane’s environmental law clinic, several law 
schools took proactive prophylactic measures to curtail the activities 
of their environmental clinics to protect against the same thing 
happening to them.84 Even without taking such steps, environmental 
 
79 Patterson, supra note 71, at 508. 
80 See Luban, supra note 7, at 240 (“Obviously, the degree to which clinicians self-
censor cannot be known, but . . . self-censorship exists. In effect, the assaults on 
environmental-law clinics function like SLAPP suits, intimidating law school 
administrators and clinic directors even when they fail.”). 
81 Id. 
82 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 2023. 
83 Id. at 1989. See also id. at 1989 nn.87–88 (documenting complaints to law school 
deans from prominent alumni and state legislators). 
84 See Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 100 (“A 2005 survey 
of law clinic teachers found that one-third ‘worried’ about the reaction of the law faculty 
or administration to their clinic casework. Seventeen percent of clinic faculty reported 
making changes in their case selection choices because of those worries, and more than ten 
percent reported making significant or major changes. In a more recent survey of clinical 
faculty, fifteen percent of clinical teachers reported that the clinical program director had 
suggested they avoid a particular case. Nine percent of teachers stated that their law school  
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clinicians may wisely “hesitate before taking on volatile cases that 
may provoke dangerous backlash against the[ir] clinics or their law 
schools,”85 thus depriving an otherwise deserving client of judicial 
redress. 
Attacks on environmental clinics and attempts to interfere with 
their relationship with their clients can create ethical problems for 
clinical directors. Schools that give themselves the authority “to 
scrutinize case selection and assume that they have a ‘right’ to 
intervene” run the risk of interfering with the attorney-client 
relationship that clinical directors have with their clients.86 This 
interference creates a professional responsibility problem for clinical 
directors who, because they are lawyers, cannot ethically “permit a 
person who provides compensation or employment, be it a dean, 
university president or trustee, to interfere with, direct, or regulate 
that lawyer’s independent professional judgment or otherwise 
interfere with the client-lawyer relationship.”87 Even when there is no 
direct interference by a third party, such as by an important alumnus 
or a member of the law school’s administration or by the university’s 
board of trustees, it still may be naive for a clinical director—who is, 
after all, a faculty member—to think that “her professional judgment 
may not be impaired by litigating against a member of the university 
or law school governing body or influential donor.”88 Large donors 
 
dean had made the same suggestion, and seven percent responded that on their own 
initiative they had avoided a case because they suspected the dean would prefer they did 
so.” (footnotes omitted)). 
85 Luban, supra note 7, at 240. 
86 Tarr, supra note 7, at 1031 (noting that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(MRPC), specifically MRPC 5.4 cmt. 2 (2008), explicitly prohibit a third party from 
directing or regulating the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering legal services). The 
way to avoid this happening in the case of clinics that rely on the law school, donations, 
grants, or other sources of outside funding is to “develop and highlight policies that clarify 
that outside-funding sources cannot dictate the lawyer’s actions.” Id. at 1037 (citing 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4, R. 1.7 cmt. 13, R. 1.8 cmts. 11, 12 (2008)); 
see also id. at 1041 (stating that “lawyers are generally free to accept or reject clients,” 
while third parties may not interfere with the attorney’s relationship with her client). 
87 Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 112 (“The lawyer’s 
obligation to a client is not modified by a third-party’s employment of the lawyer.” Id.). 
But see Ashar, supra note 13, at 386 (“The professional responsibility rules explicitly 
prohibit the influence of third parties in a representation. Because associational standing in 
litigation has limited reach, the rules channel members of collectives into relationships of 
individual representation by lawyers. These relationships and the rules then potentially cut 
these individuals off from the organizations and the resistance strategies through which 
they have gotten involved in the social conflict from which the legal action stems.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
88 Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 113. 
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“may have substantial influence with the university president or law 
school dean,” while administrators control the terms of the faculty 
member’s employment.89 This may be particularly true for untenured 
junior clinical directors or those who do not have “presumptively 
renewable long-term contracts [and] may be particularly cautious 
about taking on any potentially controversial matter.”90 These kinds 
of subtle pressures on clinical directors can create problematic ethical 
situations where a conflict between their self-interest and that of their 
clients is just below the waterline.91 
These review initiatives run afoul of another ethical constraint on 
clinicians, namely the prohibition against sharing a client’s 
confidential information with another individual.92 
While this principle may not prevent outside influences on clinic 
decisions, it at least means that, in the absence of client consent, 
professors may only provide outsiders limited information about 
their cases. Therefore, when a university official or law school dean 
seeks to influence a faculty member’s representation of a client, 
they may be acting on incomplete information.93 
Additionally, attacks on law clinics that have a “reasonable 
likelihood of preventing certain persons or causes from obtaining 
legal representation or of interfering with a clinic lawyer’s 
independent professional judgment, . . . may constitute actions 
prejudicial to the administration of justice[,]” and thus run afoul of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.94 According to Professors 
Kuehn and Joy, such attacks 
intended to deny or delay clients access to clinic representation or to 
induce a clinic attorney to render less than independent professional 
representation would lack a substantial purpose other than to 
embarrass, delay, or burden the clinic attorney or her client. 
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2010). See, e.g., id. at R. 1.8(f)(2) (“A 
lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the 
client unless . . . there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional 
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship . . . .”). 
92 See Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 111 (“Unless sharing 
the information with a dean or other official outside the course advances the client’s 
interests, the professor-attorney must protect confidential client information.”). 
93 Id. at 111–12. 
94 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 2025. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (“Legal representation should not be denied to people who 
are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of 
popular disapproval.”). 
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Because such efforts are prohibited by imperative rules of 
professional conduct, they could constitute misconduct under the 
Model Rules or Model Code [if the attacking party is a lawyer].95 
Those in the academy who allow attacks on law school clinics to 
interfere with the clinic’s administration can run afoul of principles of 
academic freedom.96 Professors Kuehn and Joy believe that “efforts to 
avoid controversy or appease certain influential persons or groups 
infringe on both the faculty’s collective right to establish educational 
policies and undermine the academic freedom of the individual 
professor to choose the most appropriate and effective means to 
educate students.”97 The Association of American Law Schools’ 
(AALS) submission to the Louisiana Supreme Court echoed this 
concern in its defense of Tulane’s environmental law clinic; AALS 
advocated that applying the factors courts consider when legal 
questions arise about particular course materials or teaching methods 
clearly shows that Tulane’s clinical instructors “have a First 
Amendment right to select cases as their course materials for their 
clinics.”98 Law schools hire clinical instructors to teach students 
lawyering skills and professional values through the representation of 
actual clients. According to the AALS, “[o]nce these teachers have 
been hired for that purpose, they must have the right, like any other 
law professor, to choose the materials which in their opinion are best 
suited to performing their objective.”99 Any interference in that 
 
95 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 2029 (footnote omitted). Professor 
Sameer Ashar recounts a story told by William Simon, that illustrates how the MRPC can 
be used against progressive lawyers, about how southern bar associations accused NAACP 
lawyers of having conflicts of interests between their group and individual clients during 
their national desegregation campaign and how, according to Simon, this represented an 
“almost-fetishistic attachment of the guardians of the profession to individualistic lawyer-
client relationships,” which they then used “to preserve the status quo and prevent 
movements from using law.” Ashar, supra note 13, at 387 n.126. 
96 See also Kuehn & Joy, Lawyering in the Academy, supra note 3, at 102 (“Decisions 
about which matter to undertake or strategy to pursue may affect not only student learning 
and the client’s interests but also the interests of the university and, in public universities, 
the state.”). 
97 Id. at 115. 
98 deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 557 (identifying these screening factors as including 
“whether the teaching materials and methods are appropriate to their instructive purpose; 
whether the materials and methods are appropriate to the relevant educational standards 
being used at the particular educational level; and whether the materials and methods are 
appropriate to the professional standards of educators in the particular field.” Id. (citations 
omitted)). 
99 Id. at 558. 
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choice, whether by the Louisiana bar or business interests, 
“impinge[s] on the academic freedom of law teachers.”100 
Attacks such as those on environmental clinics, which focus on 
“taking out the adversary” through attacking her lawyer, are 
impoverishing the adversarial system.101 Professor Luban takes 
particular note of what he calls “[s]ilencing doctrines[, which] include 
statutes, rules, and judicial decisions that allow opponents to attack 
the funding or restrict the activity of their adversaries’ advocates.”102 
He argues that “targeting advocates for the other side rather than 
arguing against them on the merits⎯robs the adversary system of its 
strongest claim to legitimacy,”103 and leaves a system with only one 
adversary that is adversarial “in name alone.”104 “When judges and 
legislatures create doctrines that enable well-funded parties to take 
out the other side’s lawyer, they undermine basic fairness and turn the 
adversary system into a system of procedural injustice.”105 
Regardless of the ethical, academic freedom, or systemic problems 
that attacks on environmental clinics may generate, the fact that these 
attacks may inhibit the activities of vulnerable clinics means that in 
all likelihood they will continue.106 
Moreover, the breadth of clinical programs that have been attacked 
demonstrates that no law clinic program is immune from such 
assaults. Any law school clinic is just one controversial case, one 
unpopular client, one angry legislator, alumnus or opposing 
attorney, or one unsupportive dean or university official away from 
attempts to interfere in its case and client selection.107 
 
100 Id. 
101 Luban, supra note 7, at 213. 
102 Id. at 220. Expanding this thought further, Professor Luban quotes Felix Cohen’s 
coinage of the phrase “‘transcendental nonsense’ to describe issues that look like 
legitimate legal inquiries but in fact employ contentless abstractions that cannot be given 
content without arguing in a circle. [But u]nfortunately, in law, metaphysical questions 
invite political answers: the gut fills in the blanks, and judges forced to decide the question 
reach whatever result they find congenial.” Id. at 230 (footnote omitted). 
103 Id. at 213. 
104 Id. at 219. 
105 Id. at 219–20. 
106 See Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1992 (“[G]iven the frequency 
and severity of [these] attacks . . . over [nearly] two decades, outside efforts to influence a 
clinic supervisor’s case and client selection are likely to continue in one form or 
another.”). 
107 Id. 
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With this understanding in mind, this Article now turns to the reasons 
why clinics, especially environmental clinics, draw so much 
opposition and why those reasons have not abated over time. 
III 
SOME UNCONVENTIONAL REASONS 
WHY CLINICS ARE PERSISTENTLY ATTACKED 
The common reasons given for why environmental clinics are 
attacked are the success that these clinics have had in the courts, the 
types of clients they represent, and the economic interests they 
target.108 However, this Article suggests those explanations are not 
sufficiently robust, and puts forward two additional reasons; namely, 
that these attacks feed on the hardening hostility that the judicial 
branch feels toward granting certain types of citizens access to the 
courts, and the growing incivility of the legal profession. This 
incivility manifests itself in bullying behavior by lawyers and their 
clients, and feeds off the comparative economic insecurity of law 
students and clinic directors, which makes them more vulnerable to 
intimidation than larger, national environmental organizations.109 
Since the more conventional reasons for why clinics are attacked have 
been well covered,110 Part III of this Article focuses on these two 
novel explanations for why environmental clinics are in the cross-
hairs of angry economic interest groups, concluding that both factors 
play a role in the current hostility toward clinics and are not easily 
abated. 
A.  Part and Parcel of Judicial Hostility 
Toward “Citizen” Access to the Courts 
Suits by citizens authorized under various federal laws such as the 
Clean Water Act111 or Endangered Species Act,112 or more generally 
under the Administrative Procedure Act,113 have brought hordes of 
complainants into federal court objecting to the behavior of 
government agencies and the activities of private entities that violate 
 
108 See supra Part II (discussing some of these reasons). 
109 This second explanation owes much to the psychological literature on the behavior 
of bullies. 
110 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing some of these articles). 
111 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006). 
112 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006). 
113 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
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these laws. Congress enacted these provisions granting citizens access 
to the courts to provide additional foot soldiers in the campaign to 
arrest and abate environmental degradation114 out of a somewhat 
cynical recognition that the federal or state government itself might be 
engaged in wrongful conduct.115 Because agencies are necessarily 
constrained by their budgets—and sometimes by political 
considerations—suits by ordinary citizens were intended to fill a void 
 
114 See Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits After Buckhannon 
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 8 
ENVTL. LAW. 589, 594 (2001) (“Government agencies lack effective enforcement 
capabilities because they are short on resources, possess limited information, and are 
subject to political pressure. Moreover, the agency itself may be in violation of a 
regulation, or a special interest group that is closely aligned with the agency may be 
engaged in the wrongful conduct. In such situations the agency may be hesitant to bring an 
enforcement action.” (footnotes omitted)). See also Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: 
Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
39, 43 (2001) (“[T]he citizen-suit device is ‘a mechanism for controlling unlawfully 
inadequate enforcement of the law.’” (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After 
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992))); 
James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2003) (discussing the virtues of citizen suits, as they “force rule 
of law and compliance with national environmental protection objectives”; “hold 
unelected governmental agencies accountable [thereby motivating] governmental agencies 
charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings”; “help 
uphold bicameral lawmaking and tripartite governance and help effectuate often 
inscrutable congressional objectives . . . . They stem directly from the core of a 
representation reinforcing democracy”; “help assure laws enacted by Congress, . . . are 
‘faithfully execute[d]’ by the Executive, with ‘[c]ontroversies’ resolved by a Judiciary”; 
and citizen suit authority “enhances public participation, helps educate law students, 
shapes public opinion, and encourages responsible environmental stewardship here and 
elsewhere, regardless of moral reference” (fourth and fifth alterations in original) 
(footnotes omitted)); Will Reisinger et al., Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of 
Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick Up the Slack?, 20 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 61 (2010) (“[Citizen suit] provisions act as an insurance policy, 
as a way to ensure that environmental laws can be enforced even when state and federal 
governments fail to do so.”); Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon 
Fee-Shifting in Environmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2004) (“Acknowledging the importance of citizen suits in 
giving teeth to environmental laws, and recognizing the often prohibitive costs of such 
litigation, Congress also included fee-shifting provisions in most environmental citizen 
suit statutes. These fee-shifting provisions change the so-called ‘American rule’ for 
attorney fees by allowing victorious citizen plaintiffs to recover their attorney fees from 
the losing party.” (footnote omitted)); Cassandra Stubbs, Is the Environmental Citizen Suit 
Dead? An Examination of the Erosion of Standards of Justiciability for Environmental 
Citizen Suits, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 77, 79 (2000) (“Citizen suits were an 
attractive solution to the problem created by the discrepancy between sweeping 
environmental laws and limited agency capacity for enforcement.”). 
115 See Adler, supra note 114, at 44 (“Citizen suits also can operate to prevent political 
considerations within the executive department from limiting enforcement activities.”). 
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in the agencies’ ability to implement environmental laws.116 Many of 
the rationales supporting citizen suits also apply to the need for 
citizen participation in agency decision-making.117 
On the other hand, those who object to anything that opens the 
doors of the court to these types of lawsuits, or object to anything that 
encourages public participation in agency decision making, complain 
that these initiatives interfere with the ordinary workings of 
government—including the government’s prerogative of choosing 
how it will spend its enforcement resources.118 These same critics 
 
116 See Ugalde, supra note 114, at 612 (“[C]itizen suits fill a necessary void in the 
agencies’ ability to fulfill their role in regulation of environmental legislation.”); see also 
Adler, supra note 114, at 43–44 (“Allowing for citizen suits theoretically fills the void [left 
by inadequate government resources] by deputizing countless private citizens and activist 
groups to act as private attorneys general without any public oversight. Centralized 
regulatory agencies are further limited in their ability to provide optimal enforcement of 
environmental regulations because they have limited information. The environmental 
impact of various activities will vary from place to place, and local knowledge and 
expertise is necessary to identify those environmental impacts which are of greatest 
concern. This sort of location-specific information is inherently beyond the reach of 
centralized regulatory agencies. Local citizen groups, on the other hand, may be in a better 
position to observe these effects and act accordingly.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 44 
(endorsing the role of citizen suits in “see[ing] that important legislative purposes heralded 
in the halls of Congress are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal 
bureaucracy.” (quoting Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy 
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971))); Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. 
Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water Act: The Role of 
Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
99, 127 (2010) (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 79 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3668, 3747) (acknowledging the “public service” citizens suits performed). 
117 See Mihaly, supra note 15, at 160 (“Yet . . . insider staff and officials frequently 
need outsider citizen input to make them wise. . . . [I]n part because staff members are not 
privy to all information, and . . . good partnerships among citizens, experts and advocates 
can provide valuable new data and analysis. . . . [E]specially . . . in regimes where elected 
officials have values antithetic to good science and priorities heavily weighted towards the 
expressed positions of economically dominant stakeholders. In such environments, expert 
staff members are pressured to select among facts and approaches to reach predetermined 
conclusions.”). See also H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 134 (1972), quoted in Glicksman & 
Batzel, supra note 116, at 127 (explaining the role of citizen suits to enable plaintiffs to act 
as private attorneys general and noting that they “provide[d] an open door for those who 
have legitimate interests in the courts, and encourages more meaningful participation in 
the administrative processes.”). 
118 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 612 n.145 (“[A]rguing that citizen groups seriously 
interfere with effective government regulatory action because the initiation of citizen suits 
removes the threat of an enforcement action, which is the principal coercive mechanism 
available to regulators[.]” Id. (citing Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and 
Judicial Interpretation: First Time Tragedy, Second Time Farce, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
311, 312–13 (1998))); see also id. (“[T]he initiation of citizen suits may result in over-
enforcement of the law, diverting too many agency resources from other uses.” (citing 
A.H. Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on Citizen Suit Provisions of  
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contend that citizen suits are often filed for the tangential purpose of 
gaining publicity,119 and can have negative unintended effects.120 
Professor Jonathan Adler takes on the fundamental premise 
underlying citizen suits that increasing the capacity of the government 
to enforce laws through citizen suits is a “good,” saying: 
Insofar as the environmental regulatory scheme is ill-equipped to 
address given environmental concerns, increasing the stringency of 
enforcement will do little, if anything, to advance ecological values. 
Insofar as detailed and complex regulatory provisions provide 
opportunities for special-interest rent-seeking, citizen suits can 
facilitate further exploitation outside of the legislative arena. Insofar 
as existing environmental programs embody mistaken priorities, 
citizen suits can amplify the improper emphases. And insofar as the 
existing regulatory regime is too rigid to allow for environmentally 
beneficial innovation, citizen suits threaten to ossify the process 
even more.121 
He notes that while citizen suits allegedly address “free rider 
problems and the high costs of collective political action,” they do not 
 
Environmental Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2001))); Adler, supra note 
114, at 62 (“Optimal enforcement is nearly always less than complete enforcement. At 
some point, devoting resources to additional prosecutions will produce diminishing 
marginal returns. This is particularly true where, as in the environmental context, many 
violators have technically broken the law but have not caused any measurable harm.”); id. 
at 64 (“By increasing the potential costs associated with facility siting and upgrade, over-
enforcement can forestall the environmental improvement that results from technological 
advance and economic development. . . . In addition, excessive enforcement of existing 
environmental rules can create perverse incentives to take ‘preventative’ action that 
actually entails the destruction or degradation of environmental resources.”). 
119 See Ugalde, supra note 114, at 609 (“Citizen groups are often motivated by factors 
other than simply claiming victory, such as the political, media-related, and symbolic 
ramifications of litigation. The initiation of a lawsuit may be a strategic decision intended 
to garner publicity and to prompt political or agency action in a situation where the 
adjudication process would be unsuccessful.”). 
120 See May, supra note 114, at 22 (“Citizen enforcement suits also have the unintended 
dual effects offering the concurrent negative incentives for agencies (usually states) to roll 
back permit requirements [anti backsliding], and for polluters to race into the awaiting 
arms of regulators to negotiate judicial settlements to preclude citizen enforcement.”). 
Many of these same complaints are made against public participation in agency decision 
making. See Mihaly, supra note 15, at 160 (“Modern commentators have argued that 
public participation interferes with [government] expertise. Such public involvement, they 
contend, can be counterproductive to the operation of good government, especially in the 
environmental arena where, for example, lay perceptions of hazardous risk contravene 
good science, and repeated citizen litigations distorts EPA’s priorities.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
121 Adler, supra note 114, at 57–58. 
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work that way.122 The individuals or groups who bring these suits are 
neither “public-spirited activists” concerned about local 
environmental problems nor “altruists.”123 In fact, “national advocacy 
groups file the lion’s share of suits,” and the majority of them “are 
filed against the least significant sources.”124 The result: 
By removing any need for the consideration of actual environmental 
impacts, and driving down the costs of establishing defendant 
liability, the citizen-suit provisions encourage the filing of suits 
against vulnerable plaintiffs, irrespective of the environmental 
benefit [while] the prospect of large fines further facilitates rent 
extraction, through private settlements, again with little need to 
consider the environmental results.125 
According to Professor Adler, “[c]itizen-suit provisions create 
incentives for environmentalist plaintiffs to pursue their self-interest, 
in the form of settlements, remediation projects, and attorneys’ fees, 
or to pursue symbolic victories with other value.”126 When the courts’ 
standing jurisprudence does not require that plaintiffs “have an actual 
environmental stake in the case at hand, there is little to prevent 
private plaintiffs from using citizen-suit provisions as a means of 
pursuing other agendas—from NIMBY opposition to development to 
economic rent-seeking or organizational empire-building.”127 
 
122 Id. at 45 (quoting Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for the Environment in support 
of Petitioners at 1–2, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 
U.S. 167 (2000) (No. 98-822), 1999 WL 311758 at *1–*2) (“‘It is a commonplace 
observation that the diffuse nature of environmental harms makes environmental interests 
relatively difficult to organize into an effective political force.’ . . . [T]hat ‘as a result of 
free rider problems and the high costs of collective political action, effective expression of 
the broad public interest in environmental protection faces major obstacles in the 
American political system.’ Citizen-suit provisions address this concern by enabling a 
small group of individuals to enforce environmental regulations directly without any 
concern for political constraints.” (footnotes omitted)). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 51. 
125 Id. See also id. at 57 (“[C]itizen suit[s are] probably best understood as a Band-Aid 
superimposed on a system that can meet with only mixed success.” (quoting Cass R. 
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992))); id. at 58 (criticizing citizen suits for “facilitat[ing] and 
encourag[ing] litigation over paperwork violations and permit exceedences, which may or 
may not impact environmental quality” and for failing to “provide any incentive to ferret 
out new and undetected violations. Why bother investigating potential environmental harm 
when a technical violation is sufficient to support summary judgment?” (footnote 
omitted)). 
126 Id. at 58. 
127 Id. at 61. 
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Many of these themes have found their way into the rhetorical 
statements of clinic opponents.128 They also find resonance in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence erecting barriers to citizen access to 
the courts to protest environmental harm.129 This jurisprudence has 
provided clinic opponents with a barrage of challenges to clinic 
lawsuits. 
The Court has exhibited increasing hostility toward environmental 
lawsuits brought by individual citizens or citizen groups.130 Courts 
frequently raise both constitutional and prudential barriers against 
environmentalist plaintiffs and have made it increasingly difficult for 
prevailing plaintiffs to earn attorneys’ fees,131 despite the enactment 
 
128 See, e.g., LCA Memorandum, supra note 45 (“The LCA Board of Directors voted to 
actively engage the clinic by targeting Tulane itself, which gives cover to its out-of-state, 
student want-to-be lawyers and their job killing lawsuits.” “Lawsuits filed by one of the 
law clinics have cost the state thousands of jobs and untold millions of dollars in tax 
revenues.” “What is consistent about TELC’s [Tulane Environmental Law Clinic] 
activities is a wanton disregard for the economic well being of the state. Louisiana’s 
business community has been targeted in a number of ways . . . .” “[When] the attack has 
centered on DEQ, the permitting time has been extended so that companies look elsewhere 
to make investments that must hit the window of economic opportunity squarely in order 
to clear return-on-investment hurdles. Tulane has learned very well that the power to delay 
permits is the power to destroy projects.”). 
129 See generally Hope M. Babcock, The Problem with Particularized Injury: The 
Disjuncture Between Broad-Based Environmental Harm and Standing Jurisprudence, 25 
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Babcock, Problem with Particularized 
Injury] (discussing jurisprudential barriers, particularly standing, to environmental 
lawsuits). See also Stubbs, supra note 114, at 79–81 (discussing the political origins of 
environmental citizen suits in the early 1980s in response to the Reagan administration’s 
failure to enforce environmental laws). 
130 See May, supra note 114, at 4 (“Examining case development reveals citizen suits 
are more challenging to litigate than ever. Challenges abound, including statutory and 
common law preclusion, constitutional challenges such as standing, mootness, sovereign 
immunity and separation of powers, and remedies and attorney fees . . . .”); see also 
Stubbs, supra note 114, at 81–83 (noting that the Court was initially very “generous” 
toward environmental cases brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, which “were 
decided in a context of judicial support for expansion of access to the courts for the 
purpose of enforcing public law” but that this “initial period of expansive interpretation of 
standing and jurisdiction for environmental and administrative review did not last. Over 
the past ten years, critics have accused the courts of instigating a ‘backlash,’ a ‘severe 
blow to environmental activism,’ and a ‘slash and burn expedition through the law of 
environmental standing.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
131 See, e.g., Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010) (holding that attorneys’ fees 
belong to the client, not the attorney); Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 
(2010) (limiting the use of lodestar calculations to enhance an attorney fee award to 
extraordinary circumstances); Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 
2158 (2010) (involving the Retirement Security Act, in which the Court allowed litigants 
to recover fees even when they are not prevailing parties if they achieve “some degree of 
success on the merits” beyond the “trivial” or a “purely procedural victor[y]” (alteration in  
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by Congress of 150 fee-shifting statutes.132 Professor Jim May notes 
that “[c]ase law demonstrates, if nothing else, that statutory 
shortcomings coupled with judicial ambivalence make for tough 
sledding for environmental citizen suit enthusiasts.”133 
The Court’s constitutional and prudential jurisdictional hurdles, 
especially the standing doctrine, have fundamentally altered the 
citizen suit. 134 “Today the environmental citizen plaintiff must have 
 
original) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688, 694 (1983)); 
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598 (2001) (eliminating the use of the catalyst theory as a basis for awarding fees under 
the Fair Housing Act and the American with Disabilities Act); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 
463 U.S. 680 (1983) (advocating narrow interpretation of fee-shifting statutes because of 
sovereign immunity concerns); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 
240 (1975) (articulating a presumption against expanding fee awards unless specifically 
authorized by Congress). See also Meredith Z. Maresca, Employee Benefits—Attorneys’ 
Fees: Supreme Court Rules Parties Must Achieve “Some Success on Merits” to Receive 
Fees, 78 U.S.L.W. 1753 (May 25, 2010) (discussing Hardt and that “[g]uided by its 
decision in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983), the [C]ourt said that because 
nothing in the section showed that Congress meant to abandon the traditional ‘American 
rule’ that each party is responsible for its own attorneys’ fees unless a statute says 
otherwise, some degree of success on the merits was necessary for an award of fees”). 
132 Silecchia, supra note 114, at 10. 
133 May, supra note 114, at 4. See also Peter Manus, Our Environmental Rebels: An 
Average American Law Professor’s Perspective on Environmental Advocacy and the Law, 
40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 514 (2006) (“There’s this issue, . . . whether an individual can 
actually sue the government if the government decides to ignore its NEPA-based 
responsibility to minimize its impacts on the environment. And without the threat of a 
lawsuit with a resounding punishment at its conclusion, . . . we’re back to Holmes’ ‘bad 
man’ calculus and the reality that NEPA has less clout than its upbeat list of policy goals 
might appear to provide. . . . ‘The lack of attention to NEPA’s policies speaks to the 
tendency of our society to devalue those provisions of law that are not enforceable through 
the judicial system.’ And in writing the NEPA statute but leaving it less than readily 
enforceable, Congress has not ignored the environment. To the contrary, Congress has 
addressed it, yet managed to leave it vulnerable to unredressable abuses.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
134 See May, supra note 114, at 11 (“Notice, preclusion, jurisdictional, constitutional 
and fee defenses, though not the only issues facing citizen suitors, are often preeminent.”). 
Some hurdles not addressed in this Article include the requirement in statutorily 
authorized citizen suits that plaintiffs allege an ongoing violation and that the government 
not be diligently prosecuting the violation. See Stubbs, supra note 114, at 86 (“[The effect 
of Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987) 
created] more litigation issues for defendants to raise (thereby prolonging litigation), for 
reducing the deterrent effects of the statute [CWA] by not imposing civil penalties on 
parties who had clearly violated the statute, and for decreasing incentives for industry to 
comply with the Clean Water Act.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 89 (“Gwaltney seems to 
have had the uniform effect of creating another layer of dispute in citizen suit litigation, 
but the differences among courts appear mainly to be technical variations.”). See also 
Reisinger et al., supra note 114, at 53 (“[C]ourts have placed citizen plaintiffs with the 
burden of proving that the state’s prosecution is not diligent. Courts have held that  
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the resources and capacity to extensively research and allege proof of 
a direct and personalized injury, that the injury is ongoing, and that 
the form of relief is recognized by the Supreme Court, even if 
Congress already statutorily recognizes the relief requested.”135 Of the 
prudential doctrines, the most troublesome is separation of powers.136 
Its use by defendants in environmental litigation is increasing.137 The 
 
diligence will be presumed, and, where an agency has specifically addressed concerns of 
analogous citizen suit, ‘deference to an agency’s plan of attack is particularly favored.’” 
(quoting Am. Canoe Ass’n v. City of Attalla, No. 03-AR-0293-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25057, at *6 (N.D. Ala. May 13, 2003)); id. at 3 (“The cooperative framework, which 
presupposes diligent and uniform state regulation, has broken down. State and federal 
enforcement budgets are being slashed, reducing government oversight and potentially 
allowing more violations of law to go unpunished. Moreover, political considerations—
including interstate competition and pressure from industry to minimize regulation—
threaten to further compromise the states’ ability to enforce the laws. As government 
enforcement becomes increasingly less reliable, citizen enforcement of environmental law 
is more necessary than ever.” (footnote omitted)). 
135 Stubbs, supra note 114, at 130 (noting that modern standing jurisprudence is a 
“change from generous jurisdictional requirements in the 1970s”); see generally Babcock, 
Problem with Particularized Injury, supra note 129 (discussing modern standing 
jurisprudence). But see Manus, supra note 133, at 518 (“It can be tough for 
environmentalists to swallow, but a good-sized portion of environmental law is all about 
circumventing the blunt fact that whales can’t sue. We must sue for them, and that means 
that either their injuries must translate into our own injuries or we must convince the law 
to recognize us as the whales’ legal protectors. But before the law can see things that way, 
the culture must see them that way.” (footnote omitted)). 
136 Another troublesome prudential doctrine is the political question doctrine. See Philip 
Weinberg, “Political Questions”: An Invasive Species Infecting the Courts, 19 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155, 157 (2008) (noting the test for whether there is a nonjusticiable 
political question embedded in a particular case is whether it involves issues “‘decided, or 
to be decided, by a political branch of government coequal with this Court,’ or leading to 
‘embarrassment of our government abroad,’ or ‘policy determinations for which judicially 
manageable standards are lacking?’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962))). 
Weinberg’s article discusses the application of political question doctrine to environmental 
cases and shows the doctrine should not block courts from hearing these disputes. See also 
id. at 158 (“[T]he requirements of a nonjusticiable political question as ‘a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; 
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion . . . .’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 
217)); John Harrison, The Relation Between Limitations on and Requirements of Article III 
Adjudication, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (2007) (“[T]he fear that drives judicial 
reticence in political question cases is about second-guessing highly sensitive and 
discretionary decisions, even when those decisions are about or substantially constrained 
by legal principles.”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79 
NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1033–39 (1984) (setting out the history, scope, and rationale for the 
doctrine). 
137 See May, supra note 114, at 37 (“Defendants are raising novel separation of powers 
defenses to citizen enforcement suits.”). 
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core concern implicit in this doctrine—and reflected in the many 
issues “that cluster about Article III” such as standing, mootness, and 
ripeness—is what Professor John Harrison calls “an idea, which is 
more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, 
about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an 
unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”138 
When an environmental plaintiff is denied access to the courts 
because of a jurisdictional defect in the case’s presentment, either for 
constitutional or prudential reasons, that usually means the case is 
over, as “[t]here is not necessarily another more concerned 
environmental plaintiff waiting to challenge a defendant’s conduct” 
after the first plaintiff’s suit has been dismissed.139 When these 
jurisdictional barriers are added to the Court’s disinclination “to give 
deference to the legislature, analytic confusion in the lower courts, 
and normative decision making by judges,” citizen suit litigation, 
including those cases brought by environmental clinics, is all but 
hobbled.140 The Court’s antagonistic demeanor toward citizen suits 
has an impact well beyond environmental litigation. “[I]t 
demonstrates general judicial hostility to all forms of nontraditional 
litigation,”141 what Professor Luban calls “progressive” litigation142—
the type of litigation typically brought by clinics. 
 
138 Harrison, supra note 136, at 1367 (“All of the doctrines that cluster about Article 
III—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in 
part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition 
but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to 
the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.” Id. 
(quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984))); see also id. at 1368 (explaining that 
the core of this offensive tactic is that “courts are off their turf,” when injuries are not 
sufficiently particularized or the issues raised in the dispute involve too much political 
discretion). But see Oliver A. Houck, Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal 
Protection, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 14 (2007) (“Far from violating the separation of 
powers, the [Professor Louis L.] Jaffe school sees citizen standing as vindicating that same 
separation. Courts are not making policies here. They are, instead, vindicating laws that 
have often been years in the making, forged in democratic debate and compromise, and 
now vulnerable to a kind of administrative repeal. No body of laws makes this case more 
apparent than environmental law. Not surprisingly, in no other body of law has standing 
played such a pivotal role.” (footnotes omitted)). 
139 Stubbs, supra note 114, at 131. 
140 Id. at 78 (“[F]ailure to give deference to the legislature, analytic confusion in the 
lower courts, and normative decision making by judges have all contributed [to] the 
hobbling of citizen suit litigation.”). 
141 Id. at 131–32 (“Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in environmental citizen suits is its demonstrated willingness to erode 
congressional power to define legal rights and remedies and to rely instead on its own 
normative decision making.”); see also Harrison, supra note 136, at 1371 (“[T]he standing  
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According to Professor Houck, the arguments particularly about 
citizen standing will continue because the elements of Article III 
standing “are not what the argument is really about. It is, instead, 
about equal access to justice.”143 According to Professor Houck, 
environmental law stands at the crossroads of the debate over access 
to the courts.144 Standing has become “the causa bellae of 
corporations, conservative scholars and business-sponsored public 
interest firms that related in no way with its values. In their view they 
were responding to a movement of a Rastafarian underclass of hippies 
and radicals or, alternatively, of upper class and out-of-touch 
elites.”145 
Under conventional case or controversy doctrine, their [private] 
financial interests will provide them the necessary ticket inside. For 
 
doctrine is essentially negative. It is designed to keep private people from enforcing the 
duties that rest on others, including both the government itself and other private people, 
simply because those duties have been violated.”). 
142 Luban, supra note 7, at 210 n.1 (defining the word “progressive” as meaning “left-
of-center, or, more specifically, something like ‘socially and economically egalitarian in 
domestic affairs, and cosmopolitan in international affairs’”). 
143 Houck, supra note 138, at 2 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 19–20 (adding to 
standing “a wide range of defenses, including ripeness, mootness, private right of action 
and the political question doctrine” as well as constitutional challenges based “on the 
commerce clause, the dormant commerce clause, private property rights, federalism and 
preemption, all with the goal of re-barring the door.”); Reisinger et al., supra note 114, at 
50–51 (“The denial of federal court as a venue for citizen suits . . . has several adverse 
effects for citizen litigants, each decreasing the potential for effective public enforcement 
of environmental laws.” These include the “[l]oss of [f]ee-shifting [o]pportunities” as 
states rarely have fee-shifting laws, which “removes an important incentive to bring suit;” 
“[l]ess [i]mpartial [d]ecision-making” as a result of states having elected judges thrusting 
“[l]ocal politics . . . into the center of environmental enforcement;” the fact that many 
states have their own version of sovereign immunity, which post-Bragg could mean that 
“the cloak of sovereign immunity could be used as a complete bar to citizen suit 
enforcement of federal environmental standards against recalcitrant state agencies.”). On 
the topic of sovereign immunity and the Bragg decision, see generally Hope M. Babcock, 
The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence on 
Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: Muddied Waters, 83 OR. L. REV. 47 (2004). 
144 See Houck, supra note 138, at 41 (“Environmental law stands at the crossroads of a 
great debate at the heart of American governance. The debate is magnified by the number 
of people affected, the strength of their beliefs and the size of the impacts on both the 
public and private estate.”); see also id. at 20 (“The threshold and principal challenge, 
however, has been the standing of environmental plaintiffs to sue. Over the past three 
decades, of the twenty-seven Supreme Court opinions with a significant discussion of 
standing, one-third have arisen from environmental law. It is the principal battleground 
between public and private rights.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 15 (referring to the passage 
of environmental laws and saying “[never] has any body of law so broadly pitted public 
versus private interests in American life.”). 
145 Id. at 17–18 (footnote omitted). 
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environmental plaintiffs, it remains a case-by-case fight. If they 
lose, for failure to establish sufficient “injury,” or “causation,” or 
“redress,” one side of the public-private equation here drops out of 
court.146  
This result fits exactly with the strategy of clinic opponents, to de-
lawyer one side of the debate. 
It does not help that environmental law “seemed perversely 
targeted at private industry. . . . [And environmental] cases were also 
targeted at the federal agencies that were promoting and approving 
these same activities, agencies completely unaccustomed to the public 
eye, to say nothing of public challenge. The insult level was intense 
all around.”147 Standing is a means by which the courts can keep the 
“mob” from “interfering with what America is really about: private 
business.”148 According to Professor Houck, “what remains indelible 
is this world-view that fuses corporate enterprise with America, 
regards critics as enemies, and sees environmental law as the primary 
threat.”149 Leading this “Rastafarian” mob of hippies and radicals are 
environmental clinics and their clients.150 
The Court’s fee-shifting decisions are also problematic for 
environmental plaintiffs, including environmental clinics.151 The 
Court’s holding in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West 
 
146 Id. at 23 (footnote omitted). But see Manus, supra note 133, at 515 (“Hohfeld points 
out that this uncontrolled free-for-all of competing privileges is part of the law, and not 
simply a lawless void waiting to be filled. On the bottom line, we see that those who 
would create an environmental right are not working in a vacuum. They are working 
against an environmental anti-right that we’ve lived with for a long, long time.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
147 Houck, supra note 138, at 16. 
148 Id. at 12. Houck views the Court’s standing jurisprudence as “a means by which 
courts grant particular private advocates privileged claims on the conduct of public 
policy.” Id. at 11 (quoting JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW 
DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 64 (1989)). See also id. at 8 (“[T]he [standing] doctrine acts as 
a rough-justice gatekeeper . . . . What also emerges is that, under this test, members of the 
Court and judges below have exercised wide reign in accepting cases they favor and 
blocking those they do not, not on the merits but rather on grounds of standing.”); id. at 3 
(“By overwhelming percentages, the same judges who deny citizen standing are those who 
reject substantive environmental claims across the board.”); id. at 9 (referring to the 
“accordion-like nature of the [standing] doctrine”). 
149 Id. at 18. 
150 Id. at 17. 
151 See Luban, supra note 7, at 241 (“In more than half a dozen decisions over the past 
fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court has cut back on statutorily authorized attorneys’ fees 
given to prevailing parties in civil rights and environmental cases.”); Silecchia, supra note 
114, at 5 (noting that the lack of judicial fee shifting can have a significant impact on the 
way in which environmental statutes are enforced). 
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Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources152 severely limits 
the use of the catalyst theory to enable the recovery of attorneys’ fees 
to only those instances where a plaintiff’s success is embodied in a 
court’s decision. The Court’s recent decisions in Astrue v. Ratliff153 
and Perdue v. Kenny ex rel. Winn154 have made both the recovery of 
fees more difficult and the amount awarded smaller.155 While 
recovery of attorneys’ fees is important to public interest 
environmental plaintiffs,156 an attorney fee award is crucial for an 
 
152 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
153 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). 
154 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010). 
155 See Silecchia, supra note 114, at 41–42 (“‘[N]early every court that has required a 
prevailing party as a prerequisite to fee recovery has applied Buckhannon’s judicial 
imprimatur test to reject catalyst claims.’” (quoting Kyle A. Loring, Note, The Catalyst 
Theory Meets the Supreme Court—Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REV. 973, 
993 (2002))); id. at 40 (“Buckhannon was described as a case that ‘will probably become 
known as the most significant attorney’s fees decision of the generation.’” (quoting J. 
Douglas Klein, Note, Does Buckhannon Apply? An Analysis of Judicial Application and 
Extension of the Supreme Court Decision Eighteen Months After and Beyond, 13 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 99, 100 (2002))). The exceptions have been courts that have 
interpreted statutory language awarding fees as appropriate, found in most environmental 
laws, to which courts continue to apply the catalyst theory because Buckhannon did not 
overrule Ruckelshaus. Id. at 13. See, e.g., id. at 56 (discussing Loggerhead Turtle v. The 
Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., 307 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2002), in which the Circuit 
Court of Appeals “argued for a narrow reading of Buckhannon . . . [because] (i) ‘there is 
clear evidence that Congress intended that a plaintiff whose suit furthers the goals of a 
“whenever . . . appropriate” statute be entitled to recover attorney fees;’ (ii) that the 
Buckhannon opinion ‘expressly addressed only the meaning of “prevailing party”’ and 
never mentioned Ruckelshaus, the landmark ‘whenever . . . appropriate’ case; and, finally, 
(iii) that the ESA [Endangered Species Act] provides for equitable relief only. Therefore, 
the court concluded that failing to allow for the catalyst rule would ‘cripple the citizen suit 
provision of the Endangered Species Act.’” (third and fourth alterations in original) 
(footnotes omitted)). Silecchia considers “[t]he most disturbing aspect of the post-
Buckhannon landscape is that it has given rise to two vastly different standards for 
allocating fees. . . . [and] the gulf between these two standards is growing.” Id. at 61. 
156 Due to the expense and complexity of developing and proving environmental claims 
and the imbalance of resources between environmental plaintiffs and industrial or 
government defendants, attorneys’ fees in environmental cases are particularly important 
to public interest organizations. See Ugalde, supra note 114, at 594 (“Fee-shifting 
provisions can be useful because environmental litigation is often expensive given the 
complex and technical natters at issue. This type of litigation also is costly because in 
many cases the defendants are the government or private industries that have substantial 
resources at their disposal.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 610 (“Environmental litigation is 
extremely costly and requires substantial resources rarely at the disposal of environmental 
public interest groups. It is inevitable, therefore, that environmental groups will exhibit 
reluctance to bring suit when faced with the prospect of expending hundreds or thousands 
of hours and dollars for litigation with little chance of financial return.” (footnote 
omitted)). The same imbalance in resources afflicts local environmentalists when they try 
to participate in agency proceedings. See also Mihaly, supra note 15, at 168 (“In most  
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environmental clinic dependent on outside funds for its continued 
existence. Since plaintiffs cannot recover money damages when they 
win an environmental case, often the only way that environmental 
attorneys can be reimbursed for their time and expenses is through 
court-awarded attorneys’ fees and costs.157 It is not hard to conclude 
that the Court’s attorney fee decisions will “have a chilling effect on 
citizen suits because the high costs of litigation would preclude the 
initiation of suits.”158 They may actually freeze clinic litigation 
altogether. 
Buckhannon has additional negative consequences for 
environmentalist plaintiffs and environmental clinics. By removing 
the possibility of attorneys’ fees as an incentive for defendants to 
enter into settlements with their protagonists, Buckhannon assures 
 
environmental conflicts, the existing stakeholders have become sophisticated and 
experienced actors. They anticipate citizen arguments and know how to counter them. . . . 
The media—assisted by the stakeholder proponents—will minimize citizen participation 
lacking in content, good presentation, and political acuity.”); id. at 169–70 (“The 
environmental effort has become dauntingly complex, an unavoidable result of its success. 
. . . [T]he environment is now everything and almost no area of human endeavor lies apart 
from its reach. . . . Thus, the human endeavor to protect the environment has emerged as 
one of the most complex social efforts ever under-taken. The resulting environmental 
regulation of necessity has become as complex as the regulated activity, and now 
regulation itself is seen as a mere part of the redesign of society necessary to create a 
sustainable future.” (footnote omitted)). Mihaly makes the interesting additional point that 
“the increasing complexity of environmental issues has made those situations where values 
dominate the proceedings ever more scarce. The environmental endeavor has transitioned 
from articulation of values and standards to an era of implementation, where complex 
policy, scientific, and economic concerns pervade almost all proceedings,” again 
disadvantaging all but the most environmentally and technically sophisticated citizen 
participants. Id. at 170. 
157 See Ugalde, supra note 114, at 595 (“[E]nvironmental litigation is unique in that the 
relief sought is often injunctive rather than monetary. Fee-shifting provisions, therefore, 
are a necessary means of reimbursing citizen plaintiffs for their work as private attorneys 
general.” (footnote omitted)). 
158 Id. at 596 (“Fee-shifting provisions in federal environmental statutes have been the 
foundation for bringing thousands of environmental cases.”); see also id. at 599 
(discussing the importance of the “catalyst theory” under which attorneys won fee awards 
where “the lawsuit acted as a catalyst for the voluntary change of the wrongdoer’s conduct 
even if the suit did not result in a favorable judgment or settlement. 
. . . The catalyst theory encourages public interest litigation and is an incentive for public 
interest groups with limited funds to bring citizen suit actions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
Particularly troubling to Silecchia in Buckhannon was the Court’s dismissal as 
“‘speculative’ and ‘unsupported by any empirical evidence’ arguments that the catalyst 
theory would be necessary ‘to prevent defendants from unilaterally mooting an action 
before judgment in order to avoid an award of attorney’s fees’ or to avoid ‘deter[ring] 
plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive cases from bringing suit.’” Silecchia, supra note 
114, at 37–38 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
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that these cases will drag on longer, expending the cash-strapped 
resources of environmental clinics.159 Buckhannon will also lessen the 
enthusiasm of defendants to enter into enforceable court-ordered 
settlements because attorneys’ fees may be awarded in such 
circumstances.160 Buckhannon additionally enables defendants to 
completely “avoid an award of attorney’s fees as long as the 
compliance occurred prior to resolution by the courts” where a suit 
with a high likelihood of success prompts the defendant to cease its 
illegal behavior—usually at the last minute, and after the plaintiff has 
expended substantial resources.161 
By limiting the circumstances in which attorneys’ fees may be 
awarded to environmental clinics and the amount they may collect, 
the Court has stripped them of critical funds to enable their continued 
existence as congressionally mandated private attorneys general under 
 
159 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 608. But see id. at 612 (“[Before] Buckhannon the threat 
of litigation often prompted a quick settlement in order to avoid high litigation costs and 
an award of fees,” noting that while “Buckhannon did not entirely eliminate settlement 
options, by restricting settlement to court-ordered consent decrees the Court has seriously 
impaired the motivation to settle.” (footnote omitted)). 
160 See id. at 613 (“Defendants now will be reluctant to enter into court-sanctioned 
consent decrees because of the increased possibility of being subjected to an award of 
attorney’s fees. The incentive to settle also is severely reduced in that the defendant may 
attempt to voluntarily cease the wrongful conduct in order to avoid fees altogether.” 
(footnote omitted)). See also Silecchia, supra note 114, at 63–71 (discussing various 
policy implications raised by Buckhannon’s abandonment of catalyst theory, such as 
whether it will affect parties’ willingness to settle and/or influence the contents of those 
agreements; the enhanced ability of “defendants to moot cases deliberately on the eve of 
judgment to avoid paying fees,” especially injunctions that “are much more easily 
mooted”; possibly drive interested public interest lawyers out of the field of environmental 
citizen suit litigation; assure only the filing of the strongest cases and thus reduce the 
potential “political, media-related, and symbolic ramifications of litigation”). 
161 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 609. Ugalde also notes that the decision in Buckhannon 
“potentially undermines the benefits presumed by environmentalists to arise from the 
Court’s decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. . . . The 
relaxed standing requirements of Laidlaw may be no more than a hollow victory, however, 
when viewed in light of the Court’s decision in Buckhannon.” Id. at 610 (footnotes 
omitted). See also Silecchia, supra note 114, at 66–67 (“‘[P]laintiff’s attorneys say that 
[barring catalyst recovery] gives defendants an incentive to drive litigation along, 
requiring plaintiff’s counsel to expend significant resources and then, at the eleventh hour 
when plaintiffs appear likely to prevail, unilaterally change their policies to moot the 
litigation and award a fee award.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Marcia Coyle, 
Fee Change is a Sea Change, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 2001, at A1)); id. at 80 (“Ironically, the 
failure to correct the Buckhannon decision could lead to plaintiff’s attorneys dragging out 
law suits beyond a point in time where the parties could reach a fair settlement, in order to 
insure that they meet the Buckhannon definition of ‘prevailing party.’ This will increase 
the costs of litigation and discourage settlement.” (quoting Settlement Encouragement and 
Fairness Act, S. 1117, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Sen. Feingold))). 
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most environmental laws.162 These decisions have chilled lawsuits not 
only against private economic interests, but also against the 
government.163 For those members of the Court who rail against the 
idea of citizens flooding courts with unmeritorious claims and 
interfering litigation destabilizing the status quo,164 it is a natural step 
 
162 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 611 (“[T]he [Buckhannon] Court strips many 
environmental public interest groups of the funds necessary to fulfill their role as private 
attorneys general.”); see also id. at 612 (“[A]llowing compensation to citizen groups 
through the award of fees furthers these goals by providing an incentive to continue to 
augment agency enforcement.”); Silecchia, supra note 114, at 39 (“[T]he dissent [in 
Buckhannon] painted a gloomy picture of the impact Buckhannon would have on citizen 
litigation generally. . . . [Warning] that by rejecting the catalyst theory, the majority would 
‘impede access to court for the less well-heeled, and shrink the incentive Congress created 
for the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys general.’” (quoting Buckhannon 
Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 623 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (2001))). 
163 Ugalde, supra note 114, at 611 (“Due to the expected decreased enforcement from 
agencies and environmental public interest groups, potential violators are the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the elimination of the catalyst rule. Defendants may find it more 
advantageous economically to continue violating the law because of the reduced risk of a 
fees award. Additionally, even if enforcement actions are brought against them, defendants 
can avoid litigation costs simply by ceasing their behavior.”). See also May, supra note 
114, at 10–11 (“[J]udicial trends show courts construing citizen suit notice requirements 
more strictly. . . . [J]udicial trends show less tolerance for citizen suits seeking agency 
compliance with mandatory duties (‘action forcing’ cases) absent a strong showing that the 
federal agency (usually EPA) failed entirely to perform a mandatory duty Congress 
specifically ordered accomplished by a date certain deadline. . . . [And] constitutional 
defenses continue to limit citizen suits. . . . Mootness continues to loom large.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
164 These same concerns underlie the benefits of public participation in agency 
decision-making. See Mihaly, supra note 15, at 164–65 (stating that public participation in 
government decision-making improves society as it: “[i]mproves decisions by providing 
decision-makers with relevant and accurate information; [h]elps decision-makers gauge 
the nature and depth of public opinion; [i]ntroduces new concepts that staff or frequent 
participants may not advance; [i]nforms decision-makers of the substance, weight, 
significance and politics of stakeholder concerns in ways that staff cannot; [p]rovides an 
organizing device and political entrance vehicle for new stakeholders who, in turn, can 
reorder public priorities and advocate for new governing processes; [p]rovides a vehicle 
for public policy advocacy on the substantive issues which, in turn, may change the 
politics in question; . . . [e]nhances the depth and detail of news reporting on the subject, 
thus educating the general public; and [c]ounters corruption, collusion, and graft.”); id. at 
165 (“Change to the underlying process is significant because it in turn may change the 
eventual outcome.”). A more serious concern is the growth of ecoterrorism. See Donna E. 
Correll, Note, No Peace for the Greens: The Criminal Prosecution of Environmental 
Activists and the Threat of Organizational Liability, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 773, 777 (1993) 
(“The aggressive tactics of the more militant environmental groups are causing alarm 
within law enforcement agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Domestic 
Terrorism Unit has actively pursued the prosecution of environmental ‘terrorists.’”). One 
response has been “congressional legislation addressing ecotage, and a new policy of law 
enforcement priority for the prosecution of environmental activists.” Id. Pressure from  
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to render decisions that hamstring those efforts. A less salutary result 
for lower courts may be the chilling effect of those decisions on 
settling these cases, which will ensure continued expenditure not only 
of environmentalist plaintiffs’ resources, but also those of the court. 
Despite the hurdles placed in the way of environmental suits165 and 
the vehemence of their detractors, they keep getting filed.166 On 
average, per year, there have been “nearly 770 citizen ‘actions’ a 
year⎯aggregating notices (about 650), complaints (at least 70) and 
judicial consent orders (at least 50). Coupled with an average of 83 
reported decisions annually, there are about 850 citizen suit ‘legal 
events’ every year.”167 Despite the Court’s best efforts to stop them, 
these lawsuits 
have transformed the environmental movement, and with it, society. 
[They] have secured compliance by myriad agencies and thousands 
of polluting facilities, diminished pounds of pollution produced by 
the billions, and protected hundreds of rare species and thousands of 
 
timber industry lobbyists resulted in the passage of legislation criminalizing tree-spiking, 
and lobbyists “from several industries, including livestock, mining, and timber industries 
from the Pacific Northwest, have been especially aggressive in seeking to curtail 
environmental activism affecting industry in part by lobbying for tougher measures 
directed against ecoterrorism. . . . [R]outine media attention requested by 
environmentalists for demonstrations and events to publicize environmental issues has 
resulted in an unexpected law enforcement backlash. Consequently, tougher prosecution 
policies against environmental activism have also been more widely publicized. Such 
attention is calculated to have a chilling effect on specific ‘direct-action’ organizations, 
and perhaps on the environmental movement generally.” Id. at 777–78. 
165 See Stubbs, supra note 114, at 79–80 (“Citizen suits are limited in multiple ways: 
they are only available for enforcement of administrative regulations and cannot be used to 
gain judicial review of related common law principles; monetary fines awarded must be 
paid to the U.S. Treasury; and the provisions do not establish private rights of action or per 
se negligence in private common law suits. . . . The plaintiffs cannot themselves receive 
cash payments from the defendants . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). Stubbs’ article also lists 
limitations, including the availability of preemption by government action, the 
jurisdictional requirements of a pre-filing notice letter warning the defendants and the 
government of the plaintiffs’ intent to sue, that the violation be ongoing, and that the 
government not be diligently prosecuting the alleged violator. 
166 See May, supra note 114, at 47 (“As gravity is to Earth, environmental citizen suits 
are to environmental law, easily overlooked, but always there, tugging toward a hard 
surface.”). 
167 Id. at 9. See also id. at 4–5 (“Since 1995, citizens have filed 426, or about one 
lawsuit a week, and have earned 315 compliance-forcing judicial consent orders, under the 
CWA and CAA alone. During the same period, under all environmental statutes, citizens 
have submitted more than 4,500 notices of intent to sue, including more than 500 and 
4,000 against agencies and members of the regulated community, respectively. This is an 
astonishing pace over eight years of about two notices of intent to sue every business day, 
which easily outpaces EPA referrals for enforcement to the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ).”). 
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acres of ecologically important land. The foregone monetary value 
of citizen enforcement has conserved innumerable agency resources 
and saved taxpayers billions.168 
 
168 Id. at 3–4 (footnotes omitted). May attributes a slight decline in the number of 
citizen suits being filed to many factors, including the constitutional, prudential, and 
statutory jurisdictional barriers citizens must scale. May also notes a palpable sense of 
patriotism and fair play among environmental organizations to give federal agencies more 
leeway to divert resources and attend to new priorities after September 11, 2001. See id. at 
30–31 (“The number of agency forcing notices and cases has declined since 1995, and 
dramatically so since 1999. [The decline] is likely attributable to [the fact that] citizens 
have all but exhausted nondiscretionary duty citizen suits to enforce water quality 
requirements . . . . [T]he Bush Administration [was] more prone both to defend itself 
vigorously against citizen suits and to contest attorney fees in light of Buckhannon, 
making action-forcing litigation less attractive. . . . [I]t is more challenging to find courts 
sympathetic to environmental issues . . . .”); see also id. at 21–22 (explaining a recent 
decline in citizen enforcement actions as being due to “the energy and resources necessary 
to perfect a notice of intent to sue eclips[ing] those for preparing a civil complaint. The 
prospects of extensive preclusion, jurisdictional, standing, procedural and merits 
challenges may dissuade some from the pursuit. . . . [Also implicated is] the ascendancy of 
the Court’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity jurisprudence mak[ing] citizen 
enforcement suits against states⎯who are often significant polluters that lack the 
resources or will to comply⎯less likely.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 9 (“Statistical trends, 
however, reveal an overall decline in citizen legal events since 1995, although the numbers 
are rebounding. Three factors likely contribute most significantly to the decline.” First, the 
difficulty, costs, and length of time its takes environmental plaintiffs to overcome “the 
statutory and constitutional architecture of environmental citizen suits,” often achieving 
results that are “either fleeting or dubious.” Second, the ambivalence of courts toward 
citizen suits is reflected in their granting deference to defendant administrative agencies. 
“Some [judges] are hostile to them, few know much about them, and fewer still are 
conversant with the myriad suite of statutory, common and constitutional law citizen suits 
occupy. Third, . . . many citizen litigators had misgivings about how the Court would 
resolve Laidlaw, and about associated aftershocks.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 29 (“Courts 
are also loath to find EPA has a mandatory duty to enforce the law.”); id. at 30 (“The 
spoils of successful action forcing cases can be fleeting. Even after finding an agency has 
failed to meet a mandatory duty, courts limit relief solely to what the enabling statute 
specifically provides be done, and no more, no matter how dilatory or environmentally 
destructive the delay. Recent agency forcing cases show injunctive relief is usually 
limited.”). May also notes that despite what appears to be a “recent upward swing in 
citizen enforcement cases, . . . those against state and local governments are waning, 
possibly owing to the Supreme Court’s recent extensions of the degree of sovereign 
immunity states enjoy under the Eleventh Amendment . . . .” Id. at 21. In addition, May 
comments on the decline in agency referrals to the DOJ, as well as EPA initiated 
enforcement actions and judicially enforceable settlements. Id. at 41 (“[T]he total number 
(not just CWA and CAA) of environmental civil actions filed by the DOJ is down by 20% 
. . . .”). There has been “a stark decline” of judicially enforceable settlements in CWA and 
CAA enforcement cases: “a 40% decrease.” Id. at 41–42 (“[C]ivil penalties and SEP 
values EPA has recouped in the last five years are down by an eye-opening 62 and 70% 
respectively.”). 
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On the other hand, the sheer quantity of these lawsuits and their 
overall success169 cannot help but strengthen the protestations of their 
opponents, including those who attack clinics for bringing such cases. 
One may see reflected in the actions of the Court and in the 
rhetoric of those who oppose citizen suits how environmental clinics 
inherited all of the animosity toward environmentalist plaintiffs. In 
that sense, environmental clinics and their clients are 
indistinguishable from other plaintiffs who challenge industrial or 
governmental practices for being in nonconformance with 
environmental laws, except for the fact that the burdens created by 
this opposition are heavier for clinics without the resources of the 
wealthier environmental organizations to surmount them. The story 
could end here, a story about hostility toward public access to the 
courts, in which clinics play a minor role in challenging entrenched 
economic interests and the governmental status quo. But there may be 
another story to tell. This second story has its basis in the legal 
profession’s problems with incivility, and centers on the aggressive, 
intimidating behavior clinic opponents—often lawyers or economic 
interests advised by lawyers—display toward clinicians and their 
students. This behavior feeds on anti-environmental rhetoric and on 
the Court’s thinly veiled hostility toward environmental litigation and 
the lawyers who bring and try those cases. It is to this story that this 
Article now turns. 
B.  Clinic Opponents as Bullies 
It may be no accident that lawyers “often play a prominent, and 
sometimes dominant, role in interfering in law school clinics”170 
despite “ethics rules and advisory ethics opinions urging the legal 
profession to make legal services available to all in need . . . .”171 
After all, lawyers are merely “zealously” representing their clients’ 
interests, which are under attack as a result of some environmental 
clinic’s misguided sense of the illegality of their client’s actions. 
 
169 Id. at 2 (“From 1978 to 1983, citizens averaged less than 100 notices of intent to sue 
a year, most of which were Clean Water Act (CWA) cases. By comparison, citizens 
averaged about 550 notices of intent to sue a year from 1995 through 2002, spread 
liberally throughout the nation’s environmental laws.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 3 
(“Since the first environmental citizen suit in 1970, and 880 more by 1988, citizens of all 
walks and pursuits, some with environmental interests, other economic, have filed more 
than 2,000 citizen suits.” (footnotes omitted)). 
170 Kuehn & Joy, Ethics Critique, supra note 8, at 1990. 
171 Id. at 2022. 
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However, the behavior this section addresses is more than just 
“zealous representation,” however misguided some lawyers’ 
interpretation of that now defunct standard may be. The intimidation 
litigation tactics that some lawyers use against clinics go way beyond 
any interpretation of a lawyer’s representational duty to her client. 
This section of the Article seeks to understand what may happen to a 
lawyer when confronted by students who have not yet been admitted 
to the bar,172 let alone received their law degree. It may be that there is 
something vaguely demeaning and incipiently threatening to a 
lawyer’s sense of self-worth in those situations that incites bullying 
behavior, leading lawyers, who are feeling the economic stresses of a 
recession, to fall back on the intimidation tactics they learned in law 
school and brought with them into practice.173 Alternatively, it may be 
something as simple as lawyers misconstruing their ethical duty 
toward their clients that encourages the incivility one finds today in 
the conduct of lawyers, which spills over into bullying behavior 
toward their legal opponents—in this case, clinical students.174 
There is no question in my mind that the tactics I have observed 
some lawyers use over my years as a clinical director fall within the 
definition of bullying. Although bullying is an “imprecise term with 
many subtypes and categories,” what I have observed is consistent 
with how the literature on bullying describes this type of antisocial 
behavior—the repeated use of “practices that are ‘directed 
deliberately or unconsciously, [to] cause humiliation, offence and 
distress, and that interfere with . . . performance and/or cause an 
unpleasant . . . environment.”175 One usually observes bullying when 
 
172 See deNeve et al., supra note 10, at 540 (“These [business] groups seek to address 
situations they view as problematic, including: ‘students being empowered with all the 
rights of a fully qualified member of the Louisiana Bar;’ ‘. . . [expressing] legal views 
[that] are in direct conflict with business positions;’ . . . .” (second and fourth alterations in 
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting letters from the Business Council of New Orleans 
and the chamber of commerce to Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Calogero)). 
173 See Stephanie Francis Ward, Immature Antics: Confront Lawyer Bullies Head On, 
Without Apology, A.B.A. J., July 2004, at 32 (describing the experience of a Dallas 
Assistant District Attorney confronted by the bullying tactics of a defense attorney). 
174 Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 208 (1999) 
(“A cause is only a cause. It is not per se an excuse.”). 
175 Rebecca Flanagan, Lucifer Goes to Law School: Towards Explaining and 
Minimizing Law Student Peer-to-Peer Harassment and Intimidation, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 
453, 455 (2007) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted); see also David C. Yamada, 
The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying” and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work 
Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 480 (2000) (Workplace bullying is “‘the 
deliberate, hurtful and repeated mistreatment of a [t]arget . . . by a bully . . . that is driven  
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there is a power imbalance between the bully and her victim.176 Often 
the bully is seeking to control an individual or a situation.177  
Sometimes the problem stems from a narcissistic personality, 
involving haughtiness and projecting blame for failure on others. 
Other times a problem may result from an attempt to preserve the 
bully’s status quo, where the bully makes excuses for his own 
shortcomings or elevates her own sense of self-worth through 
intimidation and unwarranted unprofessional behavior toward 
others.178  
“Haunted by feelings of inadequacy, bullies ‘lash out at others who 
threaten their presumption of superiority’ by doing what they can to 
undermine them.”179 
The targets of bullies are often “nice people” because bullies 
reason that nice people are unlikely “to confront or stop them.”180 
Sometimes, the victims are “vulnerable people” who “present a 
nonthreatening profile by their words and actions.”181 Other times, the 
victims are the “bold, best, and brightest.”182 Critical to a bully’s 
success is the low probability that there will be any immediate 
consequences from his/her aberrant behavior, either from the bully’s 
 
by the bully’s desire to control [another person].’ The term ‘bullying’ includes ‘all types of 
mistreatment at work’” (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting GARY NAMIE 
& RUTH NAMIE, BULLYPROOF YOURSELF AT WORK! 17 (1999)). “Social psychologist 
and professor Loraleigh Keashly refers to workplace bullying as ‘emotional abuse,’ 
characterized by ‘hostile verbal and nonverbal, nonphysical behaviors directed at a 
person(s) such that the target’s sense of him/herself as a competent person and worker is 
negatively affected.’” Id. (quoting Loraleigh Keashly, Emotional Abuse in the Workplace: 
Conceptual and Empirical Issues, 1 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE, no. 1, 1998, at 85, 87). 
176 See Yamada, supra note 175, at 480–81 (“Under Keashly’s conceptualization, 
power imbalances between the bully and target usually are present.”). 
177 See Jill Schachner Chanen, Taking a Bully by the Horns: Victims of Control Freaks 
Don’t Have to Suffer Silently, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 90, 90 (“Bullying is characterized 
by a pattern of deliberate, hurtful and menacing behaviors. . . . ‘At its heart, bullying is a 
control issue,’ . . . .”). 
178 Bullying in Law Firms: Hard to Define, Easy to Spot, YOUR ABA (June 2007), 
http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/200706/article03.html [hereinafter Bullying in Law 
Firms]. Bullies may also lack “the specific cognitive capacity to attribute mental states to 
oneself and others and to acknowledge that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that 
are different from one’s own.” Flanagan, supra note 175, at 456 (citing Tunde Paal & 
Tamas Bereczkei, Adult Theory of Mind, Cooperation, Machiavellianism: The Effect of 
Mindreading on Social Relations, 43 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 541, 542 
(2007)) (discussing the Theory of the Mind methodology for studying bullying). 
179 Yamada, supra note 175, at 482 (citing GARY NAMIE & RUTH NAMIE, 
BULLYPROOF YOURSELF AT WORK! 55 (1999)). 
180 Id. (citing NAMIE & NAMIE, supra note 179, at 51). 
181 Id. (citing NAMIE & NAMIE, supra note 179, at 52–54). 
182 Id. (citing NAMIE & NAMIE, supra note 179, at 54). 
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victim or by someone else in a position of authority, like a lawyer’s 
senior partner or her firm’s management committee, or a court.183 
Clinic students easily fit the victim and situational typology; rarely 
are there immediate consequences stemming from the bully’s 
offensive behavior. 
Since bullying behavior is not necessarily a matter of a flawed 
disposition, and bullies can be made as a result of situations that they 
have been in or currently find themselves in, it is worth examining the 
extent to which law schools may incubate bullying characteristics in 
their students and law firms may encourage the retention of those 
characteristics.184 
“Behaviors modeled by professors, intense competition among 
students for scarce jobs, and the relationship between class rank and 
employment” can encourage students to adopt bullying behavior in 
law school.185 In addition, the litigation-oriented law school 
curriculum “may teach new lawyers that it is expected and desirable 
to be confrontational when a dispute arises, and that it is normal to go 
to court at the drop of a hat.”186 Instead of “encouraging students to 
resist the bad examples they see in practice, law school may have 
conditioned students to mimic them.”187 
 
183 See Flanagan, supra note 175, at 461 (“To rationalize bullying behaviors towards or 
by peers, a student needs to be assured there will be no immediate consequences for the 
anomalous behavior, either from the victim or by the law school administration. Victims 
view the acquiescence of authority figures as consent to the perpetrators’ actions.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
184 See id. at 457 (discussing the social psychology method of studying bullying, 
“[s]ocial psychology is the study of the situational, rather than the dispositional, factors 
that impact behavior”); id. (“Bullying is triadic, not dyadic, and the bystanders play as 
important a role as the bully and the victim in the creation of a bullying atmosphere.”). 
185 Id. at 453; see also id. (“[B]ullying is the unnamed missing link in the causal chain 
between the law school curriculum and the prevalence of depression and substance abuse 
in law schools.”); id. at 462 (“The intrinsic human need for self-direction is perverted by 
the need to compete; this can result in either excessive need to dominate others or learned 
helplessness.”). 
186 Roger E. Schechter, Changing Law Schools to Make Less Nasty Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 367, 374 (1996) (“[T]he prevailing first year curriculum sends the message 
that litigation is the best way to solve legal disputes.” Id. (internal quotations marks 
omitted)). 
187 Id. at 382. See id. at 375 (“Young lawyers file frivolous or socially counter-
productive claims, . . . not because they had too much civil procedure in law school, but 
because that is what they see other lawyers doing. . . . ‘[I]f what [law students] see in . . . 
firms is inconsistent with the ideals taught in law school, the best academic effort may be 
for naught.’” (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (quoting American Bar Association, 
Report of Comm’n on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986))). 
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Moreover, the lessons students learn in law school somehow 
change them.188 Professor Rebecca Flanagan talks about how law 
school, particularly the maxim of “[l]earning to think like a lawyer,” 
dehumanizes law students.189 “Dehumanization occurs when ‘others,’ 
such as law school classmates, are ‘thought not to possess the same 
feelings, thoughts, values, and purposes in life that we do.’”190 
According to Professor Flanagan, teaching students to think like a 
lawyer, what she calls “acquisition of legal logic,” divorces law 
students from their emotions, which not only removes “the passion 
that brought students to law school, but also alienates them from other 
values, such as compassion and sympathy. Without compassion or 
sympathy, peers are just hurdles to be removed, not colleagues in the 
journey to becoming lawyers.”191 In an academic environment that 
encourages students to pay attention only to facts and rules and not 
their feelings, it becomes relatively easy for them to “rationalize 
bullying behavior as a logical response to competition.”192 A “trust no 
one ethos” is also prevalent in law school, which contributes to 
students feeling alienated from their peers.193 
According to Professor Roger Schecter, the lesson students learn in 
law school “seems to be that pure, unadulterated self-interest, and 
hardball competition are the rule . . . . It follows, then, that the rule 
will stay the same at the law firm as well.”194 Seen as a form of 
hazing,195 faculty and law school administrators view bullying “as a 
necessary way to teach students what life will be like for them as 
 
188 See Flanagan, supra note 175, at 457 (“Something about the law school 
environment changes students, not just internally, as is the case for depression and 
substance abuse, but externally, in their relationships with friends, families, and 
colleagues.”). 
189 Id. at 460 (“Learning to ‘think like a lawyer’ is also dehumanizing. Thinking like a 
lawyer is the process of divorcing emotional responses to cases and facts and viewing 
them with a logical, critical eye focused on analysis.”). 
190 Id. (“‘Dehumanization is one of [two] central processes in the transformation of 
ordinary, normal people into indifferent or even wanton perpetrators of evil.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW 
GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL xii, 219 (2007))). 
191 Id. at 465. 
192 Id. (“In an environment that encourages students to look at facts and rules instead of 
feelings, students can rationalize bullying behavior as a logical response to competition.”). 
193 Id. at 464 (“A ‘trust no one’ ethos spreads among many students.”). 
194 Schechter, supra note 186, at 391. 
195 See Flanagan, supra note 175, at 464 (“These behaviors are often dismissed as ritual 
hazing that students need to endure to become part of the legal field.”). 
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practicing attorneys.”196 Thus, “[b]ullying and intimidation become a 
hazing ritual initiating law students into the legal profession.”197 
Law firms today are beset with economic pressures brought on by a 
recession economy that did not exist a generation ago. This has led to 
increased competition among and within firms. Their exponential 
growth has resulted in the disappearance of client loyalty and loyalty 
toward one’s colleagues, the loss of time to mentor the behavior of 
young lawyers, and greater anonymity among firm lawyers.198 
Competition at all levels in the firm is encouraged and “[w]hile no 
workplaces are free from bullying . . . law firm environments are 
perfect breeding grounds for it. As individuals, lawyers tend to be 
ego-driven, aggressive and competitive. As workplaces, firms 
encourage competition among lawyers. Together, these characteristics 
make law firms bully-prone.”199 Like law schools, bullying behavior 
both within and outside of the firm “is not only tolerated but 
transcends to being expected,” becoming an accepted part of the 
organization’s culture.200 It should be no surprise then that more than 
fifty percent of the lawyers who participated in a National Law 
Journal study described their colleagues as “obnoxious.”201 
“In a profession that prides itself on upholding the laws that govern 
society, rules can fly out the window when lawyers become 
 
196 Id. (“Professors may send the message that it is okay to bully in law school because 
they are ‘soften[ing] up’ students to be nonchalant about bullying when they see it in 
practice.” (alteration in original)). 
197 Id. at 465. 
198 See Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The “Z” Words and Other Rambo 
Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, PROF. LAW., Winter 2001, at 1, 6 
(“[M]ost observers would likely agree that there exists today a substantial civility deficit in 
the legal profession. . . . Numerous causes are likely: client expectations based upon 
frequent media portrayal of excessively aggressive lawyer styles, increased competition 
from growing numbers of attorneys, increasing law firm size with the resulting loss of 
senior partner mentoring and role-modeling, new emphasis on advertising, increased 
numbers of colleagues with resulting relative anonymity, and institutional incentives for 
aggressive utilization of procedural rules.” (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Brent E. Dickson & Julia Bunton Jackson, Renewing Lawyer Civility, 28 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 531, 532 (1994))). 
199 Chanen, supra note 177, at 91. 
200 Flanagan, supra note 175, at 456. 
201 Orrin K. Ames III, Concerns About the Lack of Professionalism: Root Causes 
Rather Than Symptoms Must Be Addressed, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 531, 534 (2005) 
(“Justice O’Connor [noted] that ‘over 50% of the attorneys surveyed used the word 
“obnoxious” to describe their colleagues.’” (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Professionalism, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 5, 7 (1998))). 
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bullies.”202 Although the problem of uncivil behavior has drawn the 
attention of local bar associations,203 judges,204 and academics,205 
bullying behavior as a part of the problem has garnered less 
attention.206 Professor Schechter’s description of what he calls uncivil 
behavior—refusing to shake hands in court, name calling, shouting, 
use of vulgarities, and temper tantrums—are intimidation tactics that 
bear the mark of bullying.207 Sometimes referring to their tactics as 
hardball lawyering, lawyers view litigation as war and describe it in 
military terms.208 The lawyer’s goal is “to make life miserable” for 
opposing counsel, which is reflected in “[a] disdain for common 
courtesy and civility, assuming that they ill-befit the true warrior[; a] 
 
202 Bullying in Law Firms, supra note 178. 
203 See Schechter, supra note 186, at 383 n.57 (reporting that civility codes have been 
adopted in Texas, Georgia, Kentucky, Los Angeles, New York, Cleveland, Nashville, and 
Little Rock). 
204 See Harris, supra note 198, at 5–6 (reporting on the “hell order” issued by 
Oklahoma U.S. District Judge Wayne Alley criticizing discovery practices of two lawyers, 
as saying “‘[i]f there is a hell to which disputatious, uncivil, vituperative lawyers go, let it 
be one in which the dammed are eternally locked in discovery disputes with other lawyers 
of equally repugnant attributes.’ In addition to his ‘hell’ order, Judge Alley also issued his 
oft-quoted ‘dueling’ order in regard to lawyer incivility: ‘[The response] contains 
mutterings about bad faith and personal disputes between counsel. . . . I suppose counsel 
have a penumbral Constitutional right to regard each other as schmucks, but I know of no 
principle that justifies litigation pollution on account of their personal opinions. This case 
makes me lament the demise of duelling [sic]. I cannot order a duel, and thus achieve a 
salubrious reduction in the number of counsel to put up with.” (second, third, and fourth 
alterations in original) (footnote omitted)). 
205 See, e.g., Ames, supra note 201; Harris, supra note 198; Schechter, supra note 186. 
206 Much to my surprise when I searched the legal literature for various combinations of 
lawyers and bullying, in addition to commentaries in professional journals, I found only 
three articles—Flanagan, supra note 175, Yamada, supra note 175, and Schecter, supra 
note 186—all of which I have relied on heavily in this part of the Article. 
207 See Schechter, supra note 186, at 378–79 (“Lawyers are . . . increasingly prone to 
behave as combatants, refusing to extend common courtesies to one another. Sometimes 
called the ‘Rambo’ style of litigation, it includes such practices as refusing to return phone 
calls, grant routine extensions of deadlines, or even shake hands in court, along with more 
abrasive and hostile behaviors such as vulgarity and name calling, shouting, temper 
tantrums, or even occasional fisticuffs during deposition.” (footnotes omitted)). Schechter 
describes an example of the latter, reported by Newsweek, which occurred in “a Dallas 
office tower where a deposition was being taken in a big-ticket commercial case. Lawyers 
from two Manhattan firms . . . were arguing over a document when tempers flared. 
‘Somebody pointed a finger,’ as the account in Newsweek put it, ‘another grabbed at a 
piece of paper, and suddenly three grown men in tailored suits were squirming around the 
floor, fists aflying among the bodies.’” Id. at 379 n.44. 
208 See id. at 375 n.30 (“[T]he adversary system is male-constructed and is an 
‘intellectualized substitute for dueling or medieval jousting.’” (quoting Leslie Bender, A 
Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 7 (1988))). 
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wondrous facility for manipulating facts and engaging in revisionist 
history[; and a] hair-trigger willingness to fire off unnecessary 
motions and to use discovery for intimidation rather than fact-
finding.”209 Unfortunately, uncivil behavior is not restricted to 
litigation; “[i]t infects all aspects of law practice including 
transactional, government, public sector, non-profit, and in-house 
corporate and other organizational practices.”210 
One excuse lawyers who practice these “hardball” intimidation 
tactics give is that they are merely being zealous advocates on behalf 
of their clients; thus, giving their behavior not only the imprimatur of 
their peers, but also of their profession.211 However, Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.3 to “diligent[ly] represent[]” one’s client has 
replaced Canon 7’s duty of “zealous representation.”212 The Model 
Rules deleted “zealous” from the Code perhaps because under the old 
standard some lawyers believed that their clients were served best “by 
the intimidation of opponents, a relentless refusal to accommodate, 
and the use of tactics that impose escalating expenses on an 
adversary,”213 justifying unprofessional behavior and a “‘Rambo’ or 
 
209 Harris, supra note 198, at 10. 
210 Id. at 12 (“Lack of professionalism and the need to cure it extend beyond litigation.” 
Id. (quoting WORKING GROUP ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM, A 
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM (1999), 
available at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/natlplan/NatlActionPlan.html (adopted by the 
Conference of Chief Justices))). See also Schecter, supra note 186, at 380 (“The problem 
of incivility also involves the bench. Lawyers complain of rude and arrogant judges whose 
inappropriate behavior is then mimicked by members of the local bar.”). 
211 See Harris, supra note 198, at 5 (“Stephen L. Carter laments the apparent perception 
that in law, and in politics, the job of the hired professional requires incivility. . . . [and 
referring to a New York divorce lawyer as saying] in response to New York’s chief 
judge’s proposed rules of civility between opposing counsel . . . ‘I have never heard a 
client complain that his or her lawyer was rude.’”). 
212 Id. at 10. See also id. at 12–13 (“Lawyers who rationalize ‘Rambo’ tactics as 
zealousness are, perhaps, confusing the former duty of ‘zealous representation,’ contained 
in the former Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Canon 7), with the current duty 
to represent one’s client diligently as set forth in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Rule 1.3).” Alternatively, “such lawyers may be erroneously relying on the wording in the 
Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct or the language in the Comment to Rule 
1.3” which says lawyers “should ‘act with zeal.’”); id. at 13 (noting that the Preamble to 
Rule 1.3 states that “[a]s [an] advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts a client’s position under 
the rules of the adversary system” and that “a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf 
of his client” as well as a “Comment to Rule 1.3 which provides that attorneys should ‘act 
with zeal.’”). 
213 Id. at 5 (“Some [lawyers] perceive abusive conduct as gaining new adherence 
cloaked in the mantle of forceful advocacy.” (quoting Richard A. Gilbert, Standards of 
Professional Courtesy, 1 HCBA LAWYER No. 7, 30 (June/July, 1991))); id. at 12 
(“[T]here is a causal connection between incivility in the legal profession and zealous  
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‘win at all costs,’ attitude.”214 Lawyers may also be relying too 
heavily on ethical rules to fulfill their professional obligations.215 But, 
a lawyer’s professional obligations encompass “what is more broadly 
expected of them, both by the public and by the best traditions of the 
legal profession itself.”216 Uncivil behavior and bullying tactics do not 
comport with either expectation, let alone any sense of what it is to be 
a “professional.”217 
The extent to which lawyers trained as bullies in the use of 
intimidation tactics are fueling attacks on environmental clinics 
requires empirical demonstration, which is beyond the scope of this 
Article. It is only a theory, but perhaps an intriguing one. 
Environmental clinical directors and students fit the profile of victims 
of bullying, and their attackers that of schoolyard bullies, picking on 
their weaker and more vulnerable opponents. Their tactics come 
straight from the schoolyard—yelling at, threatening, and demeaning 
their victims—and because they are lawyers, instead of a stick or their 
fists, they use their skills to abuse the legal process to drive their 
 
advocacy. . . . Sadly, among all too many attorneys today, zealous advocacy is not viewed 
so much as an ethical responsibility as it is a weapon to use to club opponents.” (second 
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Luban, supra note 7, at 
219 (“[Instead of having an adversarial system of litigation that maximizes] high-quality 
input, our adversary system of litigation builds in a principle of zeal that requires lawyers 
to hide the ball.”). 
214 Harris, supra note 198, at 10 (quoting an Illinois circuit judge, “Zealous advocacy is 
the buzz word which is squeezing decency and civility out of the law profession. Zealous 
advocacy is the doctrine which excuses, without apology, outrageous and unconscionable 
conduct, so long as it is done ostensibly for a client, and, of course, for a price” (emphasis 
in original)). 
215 See id. at 7 (“[O]ver reliance on lawyer ethical codes as the ‘complete fulfillment of 
legal ethics’ or as the standard lawyers should aspire to, is probably a more accurate, 
fundamental cause of the malaise in legal professionalism.” (footnote omitted)). 
216 Id. (distinguishing between Rules of Professional Conduct or other ethical rules and 
“professionalism,” and also saying “It is easy . . . to confuse compliance with the rules 
with being moral and . . . minimally acceptable conduct with acting as a professional.” 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
217 Unfortunately, lawyer misconduct has a broader impact than just on its victims. See 
id. at 6 (identifying as among the impacts of lawyer misconduct on interests larger than 
clients and lawyers “(1) the influence of the law as an institution with a critical role in a 
democratic society; (2) the cost of administering the justice system; (3) the impact that the 
efficiency of the legal system has on society as a whole; and (4) the future of the privilege, 
often taken for granted, of lawyer self-regulation”). See also id. at 5 (quoting Richard A. 
Gilbert, former chairperson of the Hillsborough County Association’s Profession Conduct 
Committee as saying “Many believe that relations between lawyers have so deteriorated 
that our profession nears a crisis⎯one that not only implicates how we deal with each 
other but threatens our usefulness to society, the ability of our clients to bear the cost of 
our work, and the essential values that mark us as professionals.”). 
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antagonists from court. At minimum, these antics are a distraction 
from the hard work facing environmental clinics; at maximum, they 
may undermine the psychological toughness of clinics to face off 
against these bullies, leading to avoidance rather than unpleasant 
confrontations. They may also have a scarring effect on students, 
dissuading them from pursuing a career in litigation, especially public 
interest litigation. When added to third-party campaigns to defund 
clinics or otherwise curtail their practice and the Court’s hostility 
toward environmental citizen suits, these intimidation practices may 
be the final factor driving clinics away from certain cases. 
These explanations for the continuing attacks on clinics do not lend 
themselves to easy solutions as they stem either from the current 
conservative Court’s antagonism toward opening courts to 
environmental litigants or from the bullying behavior of lawyers. The 
Court’s antagonism has fed anti-citizen suit rhetoric, which has been 
directed at environmental clinics, and has resulted in decisions that 
offer defendant attorneys an array of delaying and debilitating 
procedural maneuvers with which to harass their clinical opponents 
and drive them from court. The incipient bully in lawyers, nourished 
by law schools and firms, finds in the vulnerability of clinical 
directors and students tempting targets for intimidating practices 
unchecked by a misguided sense of the lawyer’s ethical duties toward 
her clients. Although efforts are underway to reform the curriculum of 
law schools to make it less litigation oriented, changing law school 
culture to make it less of a breeding ground for bullies, as well as 
increasing the oversight of the professional behavior of lawyers 
through bar civility codes, is akin to turning an aircraft carrier around. 
The overwhelming momentum toward bullying behavior driven by a 
highly competitive recession economy and the successful deployment 
of bullying tactics to advance in law school and in private practice 
means that change will not come soon or easily. 
One possible approach to bullying behavior is to make clinics less 
vulnerable to intimidation tactics by making their directors more 
secure in their jobs. This could be done by granting them tenure or 
long-term contracts, and by teaching clinicians and students how to 
respond to these attacks,218 including by filing complaints with the 
 
218 See, e.g., Bullying in Law Firms, supra note 178 (describing proactive measures that 
can be taken in law firms to reduce bullying); Flanagan, supra note 175, at 468 (suggesting 
changes in law schools to reduce the “systemic failures that give rise to bullies”); accord 
Chanen, supra note 177, at 91 (suggesting proactive steps for victims of bullying to take,  
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local bar. An approach to judicial hostility is to use other branches of 
government, negotiation, grassroots organizing, and the press for 
resolving environmental disputes.219 However, none of these 
approaches guarantees that individual attacks on environmental 
clinics will end or that those attacks will not be sufficiently successful 
to warrant their repetition elsewhere. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
There exists a decades-long phenomenon of attacks on 
environmental clinics despite their professional, pedagogical, and 
public benefits. There are two particularly intractable, intertwined 
reasons for these attacks—namely, judicial hostility toward opening 
the courts to the types of cases clinics bring and the emergence of a 
new type of lawyer, whose response to the increasing economic 
competitiveness of the legal profession is to engage in intimidation 
tactics, finding easy targets in environmental clinicians and students. 
Reforming the behavior of these lawyers is no easier than making 
courts more welcoming toward the types of cases environmental 
clinics file; both verge on the impossible. Instead, the solution may be 
to harden the targets to be less vulnerable and to seek places other 
than the courts to resolve environmental disputes. However, neither of 
these solutions gets to the root cause of the problem; both seek to 
solve it by avoidance or deflection. By understanding how judicial 
hostility toward the type of cases clinics bring and how the bullying 
nature of opposing counsel contributes to the attacks on clinics’ 
continued viability, clinics may be able to come to solutions that are 
more tractable and appealing, as well as develop defenses to ensure 
their sustained viability. 
 
including “[d]on’t [t]ake [i]t [p]ersonally”); Schecter, supra note 186, at 383, 393–94 
(suggesting teaching of civility in law schools and other curricular changes). 
219 See Mihaly, supra note 15, at 167–68 (“The decision-maker can tolerate using 
testimony, comments or other normal inputs to the proceeding to move decisions within a 
defined, if unexpressed range of possible outcomes; but if the desired outcome lies outside 
that range, the participants must alter the political landscape through a sophisticated 
political and public relations advocacy campaigns . . . .”). But see Manus, supra note 133, 
at 500 (“It might be cynical to dismiss all environmental sentiment as a recurring fad that 
waxes and wanes and sometimes disappears altogether, more or less the sideburns of the 
social science world. It is probably the case, however, that the great majority of us persist 
in relegating environmental values to the world of politics, where ‘the environmental 
problem’ tends to knock around on the jumble table of hot-button issues along with 
classroom prayer, funding for the arts, and TV violence.”). 
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